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Abstract
Given that conditional cash transfers (CCTs) can be a very effective social
welfare program to reduce poverty and improve education and health outcomes, but may
exacerbate conflict, this thesis addresses strategies for conflict-sensitive formulation and
implementation of CCTs in Indonesia. This thesis raises the immediate need to address
poverty in Indonesia and seeks to learn from the successes and challenges of other CCTs,
such as those enacted in Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, and the Philippines. This thesis also
looks into existing literature comparing the effectiveness of CCTs to other social
protection programs (SPPs) and finds that CCT is one of the most effective (SPPs).
Moreover, this thesis also explores the reasoning and conditioning factors as to how
CCTs may reduce or exacerbate conflict, and finds that it can reduce conflict through the
education channel (e.g. positive peer effect, reduction of time to spend doing other
activities), employment channel (e.g. education leading to higher chances of getting
employed), and the income substitution channel (cash benefits received would reduce
incentives to engage in financially-motivated crimes). Nonetheless, this thesis also seeks
to enhance the targeting mechanisms of CCTs to ensure that it does not exacerbate
conflict. More specifically, this thesis concludes that Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH),
the CCT program in Indonesia, should employ a more centralized targeting to reduce
opportunities for local elite capture in its 7,000 districts. Furthermore, this thesis proposes
the creation of a more competitive system in electing which districts it works with by
asking district heads to submit proposals outlining why and how PKH will work in their
respective areas, which will hopefully motivate them to be more accountable and to
reduce administrative costs.
ii
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Chapter 1 (Introduction)
Magnitude of poverty in Indonesia
In a country with 252 million people spread across 13,000 islands, the
government of Indonesia is tasked with ensuring that every household has access to basic
necessities and has equal opportunities and capabilities to make ends meet. Nonetheless,
the problem of poverty remains prevalent in Indonesia as 28.6 million (11.3 percent of
total population) Indonesians are living below the national poverty line set at IDR330,776
($22.60) per month per person – which amounts to around US$0.75 per day.1 The
situation looks even bleaker when using the international poverty line of $2 per day as the
threshold, which would classify 40 percent of the population as poor.2 While Indonesia’s
average economic growth of 5.8 percent since 2010 has helped to “lift 3.3 million
Indonesians out of poverty,3” the pace of poverty-reduction efforts has been slowing
down in recent years. In the 4-year horizon between 2006 and 2010, poverty incidence
rate fell by 1.2 percent per year, whereas between 2011 and 2014, it only fell by 0.5
percent per year.4
This is relevant to education, healthcare and income distribution. Given the
magnitude of poverty, this incidence affects educational attainments of children in poor
and very poor households in the country. Since the 1970s, Indonesia has focused on
increasing primary and junior-secondary enrolment rates. Currently, the national primary

1

“Indonesia: Overview,” The World Bank, accessed February 8, 2016,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview.
2
Priasto Aji, “Summary of Indonesia’s Poverty Analysis,” ADB Papers on Indonesia No.04, October 2015, accessed
on March 31, 2016, http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/177017/ino-paper-04-2015.pdf, page 3.
3
Ibid
4
Ibid
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completion rate and primary school enrolment rate stands high at 105 and 92 percent,
respectively, and secondary school enrolment stands at 77 percent.5 However, the quality
of education in Indonesia, remains concerning as it only ranks 69th on the global school
rankings, whereas its Asian peers – Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan and
Taiwan – tops the first five spots on the list.6 More specifically, compared to its Southeast
Asian peers, Indonesia’s relative position still remains pretty low as Vietnam, Thailand,
and Malaysia sit at the 47th, 52th and 12th, respectively, on the rankings.7 In addition,
poor school infrastructure, lack of teacher training8 and low quality textbook material
also add up to some of the reasons why statistics alone do not always represent a full
picture in analyzing the state of education in Indonesia. On a macro level, low levels of
education also result in lower economic productivity for the country. Despite the
additional strain on youth-oriented social services at a time when Indonesia is benefitting
from a demographic dividend, it is more important now than ever to invest in education
and ensure that the country has strong human resources to contribute to the economic
growth in the country.
The magnitude of poverty also affects health attainments in the country. Due to
the lack of income for medical treatment, only 85 percent of newborns are protected
against tetanus. The number of children under the age of five with fever receiving
antimalarial drugs at 0.8 percent is also quite low, and rather concerning given that
5

Secondary school in Indonesia generally encompasses seventh to twelfth grade, with the division being made clear by
the terms ‘junior secondary school’ which refers to seventh to ninth grade, and ‘senior secondary school’ which refers
to tenth to twelfth grade.
6
Sean Coughlan, Asia tops biggest global school rankings,” BBC News, May 13, 2015, accessed February 8, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32608772.
7
Ibid
8
Refer to: Asep Suryahadi and Prio Sambodho, “Assessment of Policies to Improve Teacher Quality and Reduce
Teacher Absenteeism,” SMERU working paper, December 2013, accessed on January 17, 2016,
http://www.smeru.or.id/sites/default/files/publication/improveteacherquality.pdf.
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malaria remains prevalent in all areas of Eastern Indonesia (which refers to provinces of
Maluku, North Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, Papua and West Papua).9 Moreover,
improved sanitation facilities10 are only able to reach 61 percent of the population with
access, and the numbers are even lower for those without.11 Lack of access and poor
medical infrastructure, with only 0.9 hospital beds per 1,000 people12 puts 28 million
people in the country at a disadvantage as they are unable to participate productively in
society. In an isolated case, parents who get seriously ill would be cutting off the main,
and sometimes only, source of income for the family. In addition, Indonesia also still lags
behind in improving health outcomes for pregnant women, as maternal mortality ratio
stands high at 126 deaths per 100,000 live births.13 This raises the question of whether
there are adequate health services for pregnant women, or if these needs are prioritized
within each household’s spending habits. Similarly, the same can be seen in the health
statistics for younger children, as infant and child mortality rates stand high at 23 and 27
percent, respectively.14 When women and young children do not receive adequate health
services, they not only become more vulnerable to diseases, but their future prospects are
also more limited.
To make matters worse, the widening income inequality also adds to the relative
deprivation of those who reside at the bottom of the socio-economic scale. With 250
9

“Yellow Fever & Malaria Information, by Country,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed February
8, 2016, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2016/infectious-diseases-related-to-travel/yellow-fever-malariainformation-by-country/indonesia
10
Improved sanitation facilities generally refer to facilities that ensure hygienic separation of human waste from human
contact, which can include: flush/opur latrine, pit latrine with slab, and composting toilet.
11
“Improved Sanitation Facilities (% of Population with Access),” The World Bank Data, accessed February 8, 2016,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.ACSN
12
In contrast to Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, which has 1.9, 2.0 and 2.8 hospital beds, respectively, per 1,000
people.
13
Comparing to Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, which stands at 40, 10, 23, respectively, per 100,000 live births.
14
Again, in contrast to Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, which stands at 6, 2, and 9, respectively, in infant mortality
rates; and 7, 3, and 10, respectively, in child mortality rates.
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million people sprawled over 17,000 islands, ensuring equal economic and political
participation for all seems like a daunting enough task for any government to accomplish.
Nonetheless, income inequality has been on the rise, as evident through the increase in
Gini coefficient – from 0.31 in 2000, 0.43 in 2013, and even to 0.51 in 2014 –
categorizing Indonesia as a high-inequity country by the World Bank.15 Moreover,
consumption inequality has also mirrored that of income inequality, as “average
consumption per person of the richest 10% of households was 6.6 times that of the
poorest 10%; by 2013, this had risen to 10.3 times.16” These statistics are troubling, as a
study by Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002) has found broad risks that increases in
income inequality raises crime rates, which in turn affect the quality of life of those
affected “who must cope with a reduced sense of personal and proprietary security.17”
High income inequality also leads to reduced socio-economic mobility of the poorest
households, weakening consumption growth, reducing investments in human capital, and
decreasing entrepreneurial activity; all of which has significant implications on the
country’s overall economic growth.18
Furthermore, historically, development has been centered on the island of Java,
creating further tension between the inner islands and the outer islands. Data released by
BAPPENAS (The State Ministry of National Development Planning) reveals that regional
disparity has widened through the years. In absolute terms, while most of the poor reside
in the island of Java, however – which follows logically given that 60 percent of the
15

Priasto Aji, “Summary of Indonesia’s Poverty Analysis,” 4.
Ibid
17
Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, "What causes violent crime?" European Economic
Review Volume 46 No. 7, 2002, accessed February 2, 2016,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292101000964, 1324.
18
Priasto Aji, “Summary of Indonesia’s Poverty Analysis,” 4.
16

4

population reside in Java – poverty rate is much higher in the Eastern part of Indonesia.
Data from 2014 shows that the highest poverty incidence was found in the provinces of
Papua (27.8 percent), West Papua (26.3 percent), East Nusa Tenggara (19.6 percent),
Maluku (18.4 percent), and Gorontalo (17.4 percent).19 Moreover, regional disparity is
also apparent in the differences in the level of physical and digital infrastructure,
economic investment and educational and health attainments.20
Element of conflict sensitivity
In addition, the gap in poverty is found to be widening between countries affected
by violence.21 The impact of conflict and violence on poverty-alleviation efforts is so
grave that “for every three years a country is affected by major violence (battle deaths or
excess deaths from homicides equivalent to a major war), poverty reduction lags behind
by 2.7 percentage points.22” More shockingly, the report also found that no low-income
fragile or conflict-affected country has yet achieved a single MDG.23 The picture gets
even bleaker as people in fragile and conflict-affected areas are “more than twice as

19

Priasto Aji, “Summary of Indonesia’s Poverty Analysis,” 4.
“Structural Policy Country Notes: Indonesia,” OECD Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2013: With Perspectives on
China and India, accessed February 23, 2016, http://www.oecd.org/dev/asia-pacific/Indonesia.pdf, 3-4.
21
The role of conflict in development has been the focus of a growing literature, as conflict can get in the way of the
implementation of humanitarian assistance or welfare programs. In the same way, humanitarian assistance and welfare
programs may also exacerbate conflict when it does not operate in a conflict-sensitive manner. The term ‘conflictsensitivity’ is often defined as “the capacity of an organization to understand the conflict and context in which it
operates, understand the interaction between its operations and the context of conflict, and act upon this understanding
in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the context.” In development work, implementing
a conflict-sensitive approach has become essential as failure to do so can create mistrust and disharmony in what
otherwise would be potentially beneficial programs. In certain cases, inadequate planning to incorporate conflictsensitive approach could easily marginalize vulnerable groups, deepen the root causes of ethnic or religious conflict
and contribute to the escalation of violent conflict. Source: Adam Barbolet, Rachel Goldwyn, Hesta Groenewald and
Andrew Sherriff, “The utility and dilemmas of conflict sensitivity,” Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict
Management, April 2005, accessed November 20, 2015, http://www.berghoffoundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue4_barbolet_etal.pdf.
22
World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, security, and development, 4.
23
Ibid, 1.
20
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likely to be undernourished as those in other developing countries, more than three times
as likely to be unable to send their children to school, twice as likely to see their children
die before age five, and more than twice as likely to lack clean water.24”
Magnitude of conflict in Indonesia
In the past few decades, Indonesia has experienced different types of violence.
During the Suharto years, it experienced high levels of violent conflict, which included
state-sanctioned ones, as violence became one of the defining features of the New Order
regime for three decades.25 Under Suharto’s rule, the security arms of the state used
violence to repress opposition and instill fear to secure its power over the country. Statesponsored violence, for example, included the extra-legal killings of alleged criminals
from 1983 to 1985, in which 2,000 people were suspected to have died.26 Towards the
end of his era, communal rioting started to erupt in big cities in Java, Kalimantan and
Sulawesi,27 and further culminated in May 1998 as citizens – disillusioned with the New
Order regime – took to the streets their frustration, forcing Suharto to resign.28 The
violence that erupted following Suharto’s downfall was unprecedented in its scale. In
fact, during early post-Suharto years, Indonesia experienced “the highest levels of
violence since the 1965 killings.29” The available data in 17 of the 33 provinces revealed
around 21,500 people lost their lives between 1998 and 2003, consistent with

24

World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, security, and development, 5.
Patrick Barron, Sana Jaffrey and Ashutosh Varshney, “How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia,”
Indonesian Social Development Paper No.18. July 2014, accessed January 15, 2016,
https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/HowLargeConflictsSubside.pdf, 8.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
25
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international patterns of the emergence of violence during authoritarian breakdowns and
when rapid economic decline takes place.30
In its transitional years, violence escalated as Indonesia entered the period of
‘Reformasi’ and started to undergo decentralization at a scale not seen before: local
officials and religious leaders used violence to assert their newfound power and
authority.31 The weakening of the military and state security forces as a result of
democratization also led to the eruption of large-scale violence in many areas of the
country for roughly half a decade.32
The two deadliest forms of violence – separatist civil war and communal violence
– led to thousands of deaths. Episodes of large-scale violence became more common,
with the most prominent being the anti-Chinese riot in May 1998, the Bali bombing in
2002, and the attacks on Australian Embassy in 2004, and the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in
2003 and 2009.33 Furthermore, other provinces saw escalation of communal violence
which could go on for years, creating enormous destruction in terms of lives and
property.34 The most prominent conflicts are the ethno-religious conflict in Central
Sulawesi and Maluku Province, ethnic and inter-religious violence in North Maluku
Province, ethnic conflict between the Dayaks and the Madurese in West Kalimantan in
the early 2000s. The impact of these communal violence episodes was quite severe –
“fatalities were high (over a thousand in each province, except Central Sulawesi),
violence was highly organized, government services came to a halt, and clashes were
30

Patrick Barron, Sana Jaffrey and Ashutosh Varshney, “How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia,”8.
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid, 9.
34
Ibid, 10.
31
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spread over large geographic areas.”35 While separatist and ethnic violence incidences do
not happen often, they are “typically associated with a high number of deaths.36” In
contrast, “group brawls and vigilante violence” happen quite routinely, though they only
result in minimal deaths.37
Breaking down instances of routine violence, a SMERU study finds that it is often
correlated with vertical inequality, which means that “the higher the disparity between
households or individuals, the higher the chance of routine violence.38” Moreover, the
study also finds “a highly significant inverted U-shape relationship between income and
violence,” indicating that as income increases as violence increase up until the point that
conflict needs to subside to make room for more economic growth and higher income.39
In the post-conflict period between 2004 and 2012, conflict de-escalation took
place in some provinces, though the pace and scales have not been uniform in all
provinces. Nonetheless, no conflict has returned to the levels of the early post-Suharto
period. Compared to the conflict period between 1998 and 2003, the new post-conflict
period saw a “79 [percent] reduction in annual violent deaths in the provinces previously
ravaged by communal conflict.40” While no large-scale separatist or ethnic conflicts have

35

Patrick Barron, Sana Jaffrey and Ashutosh Varshney, “How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia,” 11.
Athia Yumna and Asep Suryahadi, “The Impact of Rising Inequality on Conflict and Crime in Indonesia: What Does
the Evidence Say?” SMERU Policy Brief No.2, 2015, accessed April 16, 2016,
http://www.smeru.or.id/sites/default/files/publication/inequalityconflictcrime_eng.pdf, 1.
37
Ibid, 1.
38
Ibid, 3.
39
Ibid, 3.
40
Barron, Jaffrey, and Varshney, “How Large Conflicts Subside: Evidence from Indonesia,” 14.
36
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taken place in recent years, there has been a rise in routine violence in “high conflict
areas41” since 2010.42
CCT as an approach to deal with the problem
All of these circumstances combined are very concerning for a country with the
potential to rise in economic and political prominence both regionally and globally. The
unsolved problem of tackling poverty in Indonesia hinders its goals of being more
prominent in the regional and global field. Poor households are especially susceptible to
negative economic shocks (e.g. sharp increases in food prices, natural disasters, etc.), any
one of which may usher them back into poverty.43 Thus, the Indonesian government
needs to ensure that it has the proper set of social protection program in place to help
absorb some of the negative effects of these shocks.
Fortunately, the government has been trying to mitigate the issue of poverty in a
number of ways. One is called Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), Indonesia’s version
of conditional cash transfer (CCT) program that was started in 2007. Prior to adapting the
CCT, Indonesia had also been implementing an unconditional cash transfer (UCT)
program, which distributes cash to low-income households with no conditions attached.
The purpose of the UCT program was to alleviate the impact of fuel subsidy reductions in
2005, 2006, 2008 and 2009.44 When the CCT program was introduced in 2007, it was
done with the expectation that it would tackle short-term poverty by giving poor and
41

High-conflict areas refer to regions that had a high level of ethnic and separatist violence during Indonesia’s
transition times. These regions include: Aceh, Lampung, Jakarta, Banten, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara,
West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, and West Papua.
42
http://www.smeru.or.id/sites/default/files/publication/inequalityconflictcrime_eng.pdf page 2
43
Priasto Aji, “Summary of Indonesia’s Poverty Analysis,” 5.
44
Vita Febriany and Asep Suryahadi, “Lessons from Cash Transfer Programs in Indonesia,” East Asia Forum, July 21,
2012, accessed September 9, 2015, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/21/lessons-from-cash-transfer-programs-inindonesia/
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near-poor households direct cash, and to also invest in health and education of their longterm development.
By 2012, the CCT program covered 1.454 million households spread across 2,001
districts in 33 provinces.45 By 2015, it has reached 3.5 million household beneficiaries,
and the Ministry of Social Affairs just renewed commitments to increase scope of the
program to reach 6 million beneficiaries by the end of 2016.46 In comparison to the UCT
program, which covered 19 million poor and near-poor households, the CCT program
still has relatively lower coverage. An expansion of the CCT is to be expected, as having
conditions for households to keep their decisions accountable is often more politically
acceptable to non-beneficiaries, and helps to ensure that the money distributed is going to
improve the long-term development of the country.
Specifically, beneficiaries of the program would receive “quarterly cash transfers”
ranging from IDR 200,000 (US$14.83) to IDR 600,000 ($44.49).47 The implementing
agency, the Ministry of Social Affairs, initially provided benefits to 432,000 extremely
poor households in seven provinces. The pilot program was intended to increase access to
and improve the quality of health and educational services for the beneficiaries. In terms
of education, qualified households are to send children aged five to 15 to elementary
school and junior secondary school (up to ninth grade). In addition, pregnant mothers and

45

Suahasil Nazara and Sri Kusumastuti Rahayu, “Program Keluarga Harapan: Indonesian Conditional Cash Transfer
Programme,” International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, October 2013, accessed September 9, 2015,
http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCPolicyResearchBrief42.pdf, 1.
46
Ari Supriyanti, “Program Keluarga Harapan, Ujung Tombak Penangan Fakir Miskin,” Berita Satu, January 7, 2016,
accessed January 28, 2016, http://www.beritasatu.com/pendidikan/338964-program-keluarga-harapan-ujung-tombakpenanganan-fakir-miskin.html.
47
Vivi Alatas, Program Keluarga Harapan: Main Findings from the Impact Evaluation of Indonesia’s Pilot Household
Conditional Cash Transfer Program, World Bank, 2011, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/09/17/000386194_20120917014625/Rendere
d/PDF/725060WP00PUBL0luation0Report0FINAL.pdf, 18.
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infants have to go for regular health check-ups at the public health clinics. To increase the
incentives for beneficiaries to meet the conditions attributed to receiving the cash, the
penalty ranges from reduction of cash given to termination of participation from the
program.
Successes of PKH
Initial evaluation of the CCT program has yielded positive results in improving
the welfare of participants. On average, monthly expenditures increased by IDR 19,000
($1.41) per person, which accounts for a ten percent increase compared to pre-program
levels.48 Through the survey, it has been found that the additional spending has been used
on purchasing high-protein foods and health expenditures. The Ministry of Social Affairs
also recently announced that CCT is one of the most effective programs in reducing
income inequality. An initial impact evaluation (World Bank, 2011) found that there was
an increase in the usage of primary healthcare services.49 Specifically, pregnant mothers
are 13 percent more likely to complete four pre-natal checkups and 21 percent more
likely to complete the recommended two postnatal visits, compared to pre-program
levels.50 Moreover, children are more 30 percent more likely to be taken to local health
facilities to be weighed, 11 percent more likely to get vaccinated and 13 percent more
likely to get treated for diarrhea.51
Researchers from SMERU Research Institute, a pro-poor think tank based in
Jakarta, have noted that beneficiaries often feel non-economic as well as economic
48

Ibid, 32.
Ibid, 6.
50
Ibid, 6.
51
Vivi Alatas, Program Keluarga Harapan: Main Findings from the Impact Evaluation of Indonesia’s Pilot Household
Conditional Cash Transfer Program, 6.
49
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benefits.52 In terms of cash benefits, one researcher cited the example of households in
Gorontalo Province that have used the cash to slowly build the house. In Western Java,
one beneficiary graduated from the PKH program because he moved up an income class,
after using the cash received from the program to invest in his business and pay for his
children’s school fee. Furthermore, non-economic benefits are generally felt in how
beneficiaries began to change their behavior, and saw an increase in confidence and
awareness of knowledge. These three things are achieved through regular group meetings
facilitated by PKH administrators. Through these meetings, PKH facilitators provided
information on household management, child care, and entrepreneurship. These
counseling sessions induce changes in how beneficiaries understand the importance of
seeing a doctor when they are sick. SMERU researchers particularly note the importance
of facilitated group meetings that are empowering the households. Since this goal is
harder to quantify and cannot be fully achieved in just a few years, PKH has started to
expand its activities by setting up PKH KUBE (Kelompok Usaha Bersama), a
community-based entrepreneurship program and PKH IFDS (Individual Family
Development Session).
Challenges to PKH
Nonetheless, CCT programs face several challenges in its implementation, such as
administrative cost, monitoring cost, targeting, corruption, socio-cultural expectations
and political tension. Ensuring proper and effective implementation of cash transfer
programs is important as poor implementation of cash transfer programs can lead not

52

Ulfah Alifia and Muhammad Syukri, e-mail message to author, February 5, 2016.

12

only to financial losses, but also reduction of trust and social capital in the community,
which can potentially lead to antisocial behavior like crime.53
Currently, the program targets eligible household using a 30-question test about
household assets conducted once every 3 years.54 The application process itself requires a
huge time commitment and human resources to administer all these tests. The accuracy of
these self-targeting tests is also challenged by the initial evaluation results, which shows
that increasing the distance to the registration station or requiring an additional family
member to be present at the time of registration has not improved the results.55 Creating
an accurate and effective targeting method is crucial because “crime increased by
approximately 0.13 percentage points, which means approx. 70,000 more households
were victims of crime than if the program had been accurately targeted.56”
Furthermore, implementation of the CCT program also places a significant
responsibility on the part of the district head, who is responsible for distributing the
money. Political decentralization in Indonesia also shifts the locus of conflict from
broader to more localized levels. With the average district size of 35,000 people – with
7,160 districts spread across the archipelago – it opens up potential for destructive
conflict when social tension arises within each community. Given the circumstances,
enacting social welfare policies like the CCT puts pressure on the district heads to make a
careful selection to determine which families should be qualified for the program. As a
result, poverty-alleviation efforts can sometimes lead to increased social tension and
53
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violence, which ends up undermining economic growth and the intended povertyalleviation efforts.
Targeting errors can happen in two instances: leakage – the share of ineligible
households receiving the benefits – and undercoverage – the share of eligible households
not receiving the benefits. Poorly targeted programs risk reducing communal trust and
reciprocity within communities, which reduces their collective social capital, making
these communities more susceptible to crime.57 In addition, the same study by Cameron
and Shah (2012) also found that targeting leakages error reduces social capital more than
targeting undercoverage error does. To improve targeting mechanisms, the study
highlights the importance of improved communication, transparency and increased
participation of the community throughout the selection process.58
Additionally, given that there are approx. 500 district heads at the sub-national
level in Indonesia, administrative cost takes up a large proportion of the government
budget allocated for the program. The big administrative cost of the CCT program is due
largely in part to its conditionality that requires consistent monitoring. To ensure program
efficiency, CCT programs need to monitor whether a beneficiary’s child is attending
school regularly and if infants and pregnant mothers are going for regular health checkups.
Furthermore, the selection process, if not done fairly and transparently, can also
lead to more conflict as the added pressure of perception of widening income distribution
also adds to the possibility of conflict through the implementation of these programs.
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This is an especially pertinent issue when the targeted area has had pre-existing social,
religious, or ethnic conflict prior to the introduction of the CCT. Conflict often gets in the
way of development, and can affect the flow of implementation of CCTs. At the same
time, introducing CCT in conflict-ridden communities may help to reduce conflicts in
these areas. Often times, conflict affects economic activity as it delegitimizes the rule of
law, creates insecure property rights – that may reduce investment – and creates an
additional tax in conducting economic activity.59 Thus, a program that helps to reduce
violence and conflict is likely to have beneficial long-term social, economic and political
effects.
On top of that, results from a field study conducted by SMERU researchers also
show that the lack of physical access to some villages has caused facilitators to only be
able to visit some villages sparingly. In some cases, facilitators would only visit when
disbursing cash benefits (once every three to four months), making monitoring
conditionalities harder. As a result, PKH has run into problems with verifying the
fulfilment of conditionalities, as coordination between the facilitators and the school and
health center authorities is weak. A better system of taking notes of students’ attendance
in schools is also important.
In addition, training and education of program facilitators, whose knowledge and
understanding of the program, is still lacking. Given that training has only occurred twice
in seven years (once in 2007 and again in 2014), there is a lot of misinformation and
miscommunication. The lack of training is concerning, given the tasks that facilitators
59
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face in dealing with poor households of various characteristics and backgrounds. At the
heart of it, the key to behavioral change in poor households lies in the ability of the
facilitators to motivate PKH beneficiaries. One successful approach for facilitators is to
visit beneficiary households whose children would not go to school otherwise.
The lack of facilitators has led to program administrators lowering their standards
of what an ideal facilitator should be able to do. The difficulty in finding qualified
facilitators can be explained by the lack of incentives. PKH facilitators are expected to
fully dedicate themselves to the program, but the work benefits they get is not
comparable to the tasks that they have to perform. The expectations for facilitators that
they cannot have another job that takes more than six hours per day, whereas people often
view working for the CCT program as a side job. The lack of incentives drains the
motivation of CCT facilitators. This has led to inappropriate charges on the beneficiaries.
A SMERU case study reports cases of facilitators facilitators demanding IDR10,000
($0.76) from each household.
Conflicts arising from administration of Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)
Some parties – including beneficiary households, PKH facilitators and village
officials – admit that there are still targeting errors of overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness in the PKH program. However, SMERU researchers have pointed out
that that they have never found a big conflict arising due to the lack of targeting
accuracy.60 Usually, the problem of targeting error is reduced by village officials using
“cross subsidies,” which is to cut other benefits from other programs (e.g. Bantuan
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Langsung Sementara Masyarakat, benefits given to mitigate the effects of removal of oil
subsidies) to give to other households that are considered deserving but are not registered
as beneficiaries of PKH.61 Beneficiaries have suggested that the timing of the cash
disbursements should not occur too often, as they create a sense of jealousy among nonbeneficiary households. Though this has not created major conflict, some beneficiaries
have admitted to being “teased.”
Rather than causing conflict, Indonesia has used PKH as a tool to help victims in
conflict-ridden areas. The Minister of Social Affairs Khofifah Indar Parawansa has
stated that PKH will be made available for victims of conflict in Aceh and families of
members of the former Free Aceh Movement (GAM).62
Roadmap
Overall, this thesis demonstrates that when designed and implemented properly,
CCT can be a powerful tool to reduce poverty, improve living conditions, and reduce
conflict in the area that it operates in. To illustrate this main point, chapter two is going to
cover a more in-depth analysis of Indonesia’s CCT program, Program Keluarga
Harapan (PKH), and a comparative analysis of CCT programs’ successes and challenges
in other countries (mainly focusing on Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, and Turkey).
Moreover, chapter three looks at the conditioning factors of CCTs, by exploring
underlying assumptions as to why CCTs may or may not work. Finally, chapter four
contains a comparison of CCT to other types of social protection program; and
investigates further the question of designing the most effective targeting method.
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Chapter 2a (Indonesia’s CCT program)
Indonesia’s CCT program, Program Keluarga Harapan, has been rapidly
developing since the pilot program was rolled out in 2007 with 348 participating subdistricts in 49 districts at seven provinces, covering 0.5 million poor households.63 The
most recent data show that in 2015, it reached 3.5 million household beneficiaries; and
the Ministry of Social Affairs just renewed commitments to increase scope of the
program to reach six million beneficiaries by the end of 2016.64 The CCT was designed
with three goals in mind: to provide more income to the poor, to improve access of the
poor to basic healthcare and nutrition especially for children and pregnant women, and to
increase net enrollment in elementary and junior secondary school for the poor children.65
Geographic targeting
First, at the provincial level, the pilot provinces were selected based on each
provincial government’s willingness to join the program, and the extent to which they
represented Indonesia’s diverse characteristics.66 Then, at the district level, 80 percent of
the poorest districts are chosen based on transition rate, malnutrition and poverty rate. It
is further filtered through from districts that are selected for a different social protection
policy program, the rural community-driven development project. At this stage, during
the pilot program, 49 districts and cities were considered eligible. Furthermore, at the
sub-district level, those considered “supply-side ready” are randomly selected to
63

Program Keluarga Harapan, “The Indonesian Conditional Cash Transfer Program,” World Bank, n.d.,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTISPMA/Resources/383704-1184250322738/39860441232724009177/Group_8a_CCT_Indonesia.pdf
64
Supriyanti, “Program Keluarga Harapan, Ujung Tombak Penangan Fakir Miskin.”
65
Program Keluarga Harapan, “The Indonesian Conditional Cash Transfer Program.”
66
Alatas, Program Keluarga Harapan: Main Findings from the Impact Evaluation of Indonesia’s Pilot Household
Conditional Cash Transfer Program, 16.

18

participate in the program, which are determined by statistical analysis of existing health
and educational facilities and providers. In the end, 588 sub-districts were selected, with
259 as treatment groups and the other 329 as control groups.67
Beneficiary selection
From 2007 until 2012, the National Statistic Agency used a basic health and
education survey to identify extremely poor households. This list is updated annually.
The 2005 registry contained about 19.1 million households, supposedly at the lowest
income distribution, and had [also] been used as the list for the temporary unconditional
cash transfer in 2005.68 The survey not only contains questions to assess households but
also the readiness of the facilities in certain areas to host PKH. Starting from 2012, PKH
program administrators started using the Unified Database (Basis Data Terpadu) in
conjunction with the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty (TNP2K), which
contains the names and addresses of individuals from households in the lowest 40 percent
of welfare distribution.69 Furthermore, to minimize exclusion errors, program
administrators also interviewed other households not included in the list to identify newly
poor households. However, results showed limited impact as only five percent of
households were included in the new list. Furthermore, a proxy-means test was used to
identify households, who were further screened through categorical targeting based on
their demographics.70 The criteria include: households with pregnant and/or lactating
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women, children aged 0-15 years, and children aged 16-18 years who have not completed
nine years of basic education.
From there, the National Statistics Agency (BPS) hands the list to implementing
agency, Ministry of Social Affairs, who are responsible for finalizing and approving list
of beneficiaries. While originally the program only meant to target “very poor
households,” additional funding became available so that the scope of beneficiaries may
include those in the “poor households” category.71 To assemble the final beneficiary list,
the PKH Implementation Unit (UPPKH) reviewed the data with potential PKH candidate
households. Through this selection process, approximately 430,000 beneficiary
households were identified during the pilot program in 2007.72 By 2016, the Minister of
Social Affairs Khofifah Indar Parawansa aims to increase beneficiaries to six million
households.73
Cash benefits
The amount that each household receives depends on its individual circumstances.
In general, each household will receive a set amount of IDR 200,000 (US$15.26)
annually, and households will receive additional cash if they satisfy one of the following
conditions: a pregnant mother and children under the age of 6 will receive an additional
IDR 800,000 (US$61), primary school children will receive an additional IDR 400,000
(US$30.5), secondary school children will receive IDR800,000 (US$61).74 Thus, the least
71
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amount of money that beneficiaries will receive is IDR 600,000 (US$45.77), and the
most is IDR 2,200,000 (US$167.81).75 However, initial evaluations have come to the
conclusion that the amount of cash benefits is too small to cover education and health
expenditures. For example, “the poorest 20 percent of households in Indonesia spend, on
average, IDR2.8 million (US$213.6) for a year of secondary education per student, which
represents approximately 30 percent of total household expenditures.76” As a result, the
maximum amount of money that beneficiaries may receive (US$167.81), is not enough to
cover one aspect of the conditionality. Thus, for PKH benefits to reach its full potential,
the amount of cash benefits needs to be reevaluated to mirror the real needs of poor
households.
Impact evaluation
An initial evaluation found that the CCT program helped to increase average
monthly expenditures on food and healthcare by IDR 19,000 ($1.41) per person, which
amounts to a ten percent increase when compared to pre-program levels.77 The evaluation
also found that generally households spend most of the additional income on high-protein
foods and health care.78 The study also found that mothers are more likely to complete
four pre-natal check-ups by 13 percent compared to pre-program levels, and are 21
percent more likely to complete the two post-natal visits.79 For children up to five years
old, the chances of going to the local health facilities to be weighed increased by 30
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percent above baseline levels.80 Similarly, the chances of children getting vaccinated and
getting sent to healthcare facilities when having diarrhea also increased by 11 and 13
percent, respectively, compared to pre-program levels.81
However, as CCT is a demand-side intervention, the introduction of the program
has caused an increase in the price of health services for both local health facilities and
price of midwives. This dilemma is consistent with one found in another CCT program
which shows that pregnant mothers and children are utilizing health services more, yet
there are hardly any changes in health outcomes. The weakness in supply-side reveals a
general disadvantage found in CCT programs, in which little or no focus is being directed
to strengthening and enhancing the quality of the health service providers. While in the
initial pilot provinces, supply-side readiness is one of the main determinants, the program
will face great difficulty ensuring every sub district will meet its criteria once it starts to
expand to further areas in the country.82
In terms of education outcomes, the initial 3-year survey did not reveal any
pattern changes in terms of enrolment rates and dropout rates. One explanation for this is
that the quarterly cash transfers received did not coincide with the academic school year,
which did not allow parents to pay for tuition in time.83 Additionally, some parents may
not be able to afford to pay for out-of-pocket expenses (e.g. uniform, textbooks),
especially if their children are in junior secondary school (seventh to ninth grade). 84
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Moreover, comparing CCT areas with non-CCT areas, the program also does not show
any significant changes in level of school enrolment as primary school enrolment rate
stands high at 95 percent.85 The junior secondary school enrolment rate is slightly lower,
at 83 percent, however, the evaluation did not yield any differences, which reveals
another problem that need to be addressed.
One of the other implied benefits of the CCT is to increase the incentives for
students to attend school, thereby lowering the rate of child labor. However, since child
labor rates have not gone down since the start of the program, many have suggested that
the amount distributed is not enough to lure children to quit work and go back to
school.86 The impact on education also suffers from the supply constraints faced by
education providers. An initial report by the National Development Planning Agency
found that supply constraints on the education side is apparent in the “[lack of]
availability of teachers, overcrowded classrooms, insufficient teaching materials and
classroom equipment.87”
Budget stabilization
The structure of poverty alleviation programs in Indonesia is divided into three
different clusters: Cluster 1 is the poverty alleviation program that targets individuals and
households (e.g. CCT, subsidized rice program, health insurance and education cash
assistance), Cluster 2 includes programs that are community-driven (e.g. PNPM
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programs), and Cluster 3 includes micro and small enterprises program (e.g. Kredit
Usaha Rakyat, a credit guarantee program administered by participating public and
private banks).88 Given PKH’s position as a Cluster 1 poverty alleviation program, it has
a consolidated multi-year, stand-alone budget, which allows for an easier examination of
budget formulation and implementation.89 Indonesia’s Medium Term (4-year)
Development Plan explicitly outlines PKH beneficiary numbers and budget ceilings for
four years.90 Moreover, in recent years, PKH has seen improvements in more timely fund
disbursements; despite some disbursement delays in its pilot year in 2007, PT Pos
(Indonesia’s national postal service) was able to deliver three out of the four quarterly
payments on time in 2008 and 2009.91
Going forward, PKH plans to expand coverage to more beneficiaries (as many as
six million households in 2016), hopes to double its number of graduates (from 400
thousand to 800 thousand), and plans that by 2017, PKH will be able to cover 25 percent
of extremely poor households in the country.92 President Jokowi, who ran on a populist
platform, has been in strong support of the program, and seeks to increase its budget by
78 percent, from IDR5.6 trillion (US$423.6 million) in 2015, to IDR9.98 trillion
(US$754.9 million) in 2016.93
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Graduation schemes
Beneficiaries can only stay in the PKH program for a maximum of six years, at
which point they are ushered into either one of the graduation programs (e.g. other social
assistance programs or other employment-related services) to facilitate them out of
poverty if they still have not exceeded the household income/consumption level cut-off
point. Prior to the 6-year period, households can also exit the program based on changes
in family status, which is reviewed during the recertification period performed once in
three years.94 The success of a conditional cash transfer program is in a way contingent
upon its graduation rate, but also partly on the ability of beneficiaries to be financially
independent and seamlessly integrate into the social and economic system. Chile has
done this by setting up a multi-layered bridge program to ensure that poor families can
reintegrate themselves back into the wider national economy, whereas Brazil has worked
with local microcredit and business development enterprises to promote financial
independence and entrepreneurship.95 Thus, effective graduation schemes would include
programs that build on the components of the PKH, such as, well-targeted subsidies in
education and health, community development initiatives, direct and proactive
entrepreneurship initiatives.
PKH KUBE
In 2015, the government rolled out a new type of graduation approach to PKH,
called “Program Keluarga Harapan Kelompok Usaha BErsama,” (PKH KUBE) a type
of business-entrepreneurship program. The PKH KUBE builds on the pre-existing KUBE
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program that has existed since 1983.96 KUBE requires that poor individuals form a group
of ten to create their own business plan, which, if successful, will grant them US$2,000
worth of base capital to jumpstart their business. Each group is also equipped with a
facilitator, and they meet regularly once a month for three years.97 Changes in the PKH
KUBE not currently present in the regular KUBE program include an emphasis on
coaching components by the facilitators for the full three-year duration, instead of the
former six-month duration. Another difference is that PKH KUBE participants continue
to receive the PKH cash benefits for an additional three years, which could go up to
US$300 per year, depending on the category in which they fit (e.g. pregnancy, number of
children under five years old, etc.). Moreover, additional benefits include scholarships for
school-aged children, health insurance for all family members, and access to a subsidized
rice program.98 In addition, given that PKH KUBE is implemented at a nationwide scale,
it has also established a web-based learning center for facilitators and beneficiaries.
Currently, the biggest challenge is to mesh together all the various components of the
graduation program. While most activities are under the supervision of the Ministry of
Social Affairs, some activities, such as the scholarship program and the health insurance
program lie under the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health, respectively.99
PNPM Generasi
While Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM) Generasi is not a
formal graduation scheme under PKH, it is considered a complementary program to the
96

Kartika Sari Juniwaty and Hartono Laras, “Adapting the Graduation Model to Reach Indonesia’s Ultra Poor,” CGAP,
December 11, 2015, accessed April 1, 2016, http://www.cgap.org/blog/adapting-graduation-model-reach-indonesiasultra-poor
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Juniwaty and Laras, “Adapting the Graduation Model to Reach Indonesia’s Ultra Poor.”

26

PKH, as they share many common goals and objectives. Similar to PKH, PNPM
Generasi is a social protection program designed to support Indonesia’s goal of meeting
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the areas of maternal health, child health
and universal education.100 The main difference is that PKH targets individuals and
households (Cluster 1 of poverty alleviation programs), whereas PNPM Generasi is more
community driven.
PNPM Generasi has approximately three and a half million beneficiaries, 50
percent of whom are women. However, its scope is not as far-reaching as PKH, as it is
currently only active in eight provinces.101 PNPM is an incentivized community block
grant program, which builds on similar objectives to that of the PNPM rural. The flexible
approach is expected to help in reducing regional disparity in terms of health and
educational attainments across Indonesia. Instead of individual households, PNPM
focuses its effort on the community to make decisions and allocate IDR110,000,000
(approx. US$12,000) per village/year of grant fund to target 12 health and education
indicators.102 To ensure that villages are coming up with the most effective policies, the
budget for the subsequent year is determined by the program’s effectiveness of tackling
the 12 indicators in this current year.
Thus far, PNPM Generasi has shown positive impacts in both health and
education indicators, with health indicators showing the largest gains.103 Some of these
gains include “increased frequency of weight checks for young children, increase in the
100
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number of iron sachets pregnant mothers receive through antenatal care visits and
dramatic increases in health post (posyandu) participation by mothers and children to
receive targeted maternal, neonatal, and child health services.104” Furthermore, a
reduction in childhood malnutrition levels ten percent greater than that of children not in
the program, and a program evaluation found that the most significant reductions were
found in areas that had higher malnutrition rates pre-PKH, which is especially apparent in
the case of Nusa Tenggara Timur.105 In general, the evaluation found that “PNPM
Generasi had the greatest impact in areas with low baseline health and education
indicators. On average, the project was about twice as effective in areas with very low
health and education status (10th percentile of service provision).106”
Other complementary programs
Since the creation of the National Single Registry (BDT) in 2011, linking up
complementary programs has become a much easier task. As a result, the names and
addresses included in PKH’s program expansion are also included in the targeting for
other programs such as Jamkesmas (health insurance program), Raskin (subsidized rice
program) and BSM (assistance for poor students).107 Another crucial component is the
role of facilitators in ensuring that PKH beneficiaries are able to access various services
offered by the other programs. For example, facilitators should judge whether the PKH
cash benefits are enough to buy the subsidized rice from the Raskin program. The role of
the facilitator can also be further maximized as the main contact person with both local
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and central government agencies.108 Moreover, to fully take advantage of program
complementarity, program administrators have to make sure that the areas that they
operate in have existing school and health infrastructure to be able to support the
programs and ensure its effectiveness. Given that the role of the local leaders are crucial
in developing local infrastructure, a closer coordination between PKH program
administrators, central and local governments remain a pivotal challenge in the years to
come.
One recommendation to increase efficiency and coherence of the program is for
program administrators to consider consolidating PKH and its graduation programs,
similar to how Brazil consolidated its social welfare programs into one streamlined
program in the form of Bolsa Familia. Aligning different programs into one might ensure
smoother transition for beneficiaries, as well as smoother budget and administrative
processes.
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Chapter 2b: Cross-country comparisons of CCT
Impact that CCT has made in other countries
In recent times the CCT has been one of the most effective social welfare
programs implemented in several other developing countries, among them Brazil,
Mexico, Turkey, and the Philippines. These cases are introduced to show what has been
accomplished with respect to impact on income, education and health. They also
demonstrate the challenges that other CCT programs have faced and how they have been
able to overcome them.
Impact on income and poverty
A study done by Fiszbein & Schady (2009) uses three poverty measures to assess
the impact of CCTs on income and poverty levels at the program level: headcount index
(number of people below the poverty line), poverty gap (average distance between
consumption of poor people and the poverty line), and the squared poverty gap
(distribution of resources among the poor).109 Generally, a large impact on consumption
also translates into large impact on poverty. For example, in Nicaragua, its CCT program,
the Red de Protección Social (RDS), saw a five to seven percent reduction in the
headcount index, and a nine to 13-point drop in its poverty gap. Likewise, Colombia’s
CCT program, Familias en Accion, saw a seven percentage point drop on the poverty gap
and Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades saw a 19 percent reduction in the poverty gap
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between 1996 and 2006.110 Moreover, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program has had a
significant effect in reducing extreme poverty. For the poorest five percent of the
population, the cash transfers that household receive amount to approximately 10 percent
or more of their income. Thus, a small cash transfer leads to a bigger impact. In Brazil, a
poverty-gap analysis reveals that Bolsa Familia was responsible for a 12 percent
reduction in poverty.111 In 2004 and 2006 alone, the Bolsa Familia program was said to
be responsible for reducing income inequality by 21 percent, and for pulling 4.3 million
families (out of 12.4 million families) out of extreme poverty.112
Increase in household expenditure and consumption
The objectives of most CCT programs are targeted towards improving the
wellbeing of children, thus, they tend to shift budgetary allocations in favor of children as
well.113 Moreover, since the cash disbursements are given to women, it increases their
bargaining power in the household, resulting in an increase in food expenditures in the
family.114 However, it remains unclear if these shifts arise out of an increase in income or
due to other components of CCT programs.115 For some CCT programs, like the Bolsa
Familia, CCT has not affected the aggregate level of household consumption, though the
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reverse is true in Mexico’s Oportunidades program.116 In terms of CCTs’ impact on
consumption, it tends to increase the consumption of items such as food, which was
found in the case of Bolsa Familia in Brazil. 117 Soares, Ribas and Osorio (2007) found
that “monthly expenditures on [food, education and children’s clothing] increased
R$23.18 (US$11.6), R$2.65 (US$1.3) and R$1.34 (US$0.67), respectively, in beneficiary
households.118” The change in consumption patterns not only reveal that households are
buying more food, but that they are buying higher quality food, such as meat, fruits and
vegetables.119
In Mexico, given that the additional cash could only be attained by fulfilling
conditionalities set out for children and pregnant mothers, the extra cash is perceived to
be a “bonus to be spent in the best interest of their children and the mothers.120” Another
study by Rawlings & Rubio (2005) also confirms that average level of consumption in
Mexico rose 13 percentage points higher after just one year of operation; and food
consumption was 11 percent higher in participating households than in non-participating
households.121
Looking at the long-term impacts of CCTs on consumption, CCTs can have
substantial impact in the long-term if households were to invest the cash benefits into
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productive activities. Gertler, Martinez & Rubio-Codina (2012) finds that rural Mexican
households were able to increase their income by 10 percent after receiving 18 monthsworth of cash benefits by investing it and estimates that households invest approx. 26
percent of their income.122
Impact on education
Bolsa Familia has also reported a positive impact on school attendance. Children
whose families were participating in the program reported 3.6 percentage points lower in
terms of school absence and 1.6 percentage points lower in probability of dropping out
than those who were not in the program.123
Mexico’s CCT program, Oportunidades, which provides monetary educational
grants to participating households with children enrolled in school between 3rd and 11th
grade124, also saw similar results in increasing school attendance, reducing the number of
dropouts and increasing re-entry rates among older dropouts.125 “For Mexico, Behrman et
al (2005) show that longer exposure to Progesa/Oportunidades has a positive impact on
grades of schooling attained, and positive spillover effects to children in ineligible
households, but no effects on achievement tests.126” Nonetheless, with the sudden
increase in the number of students who are attending school for the first time or reentering, some schools found that overall achievement scores were negatively affected as
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many of the students “are likely to have greater difficulty in catching up with those who
have always been in school.127”
Meanwhile, the Philippines also noticed a 38 percent increase in education
spending per capita compared to those who are not enrolled in the program, indicating a
shifting trend that households are investing more money into education for their
children.128 In Turkey, the impact of the program in education also helped to indirectly
advance women’s empowerment in the country. Their CCT program – benefits six
percent of the Turkish population and seeks to increase school attendance rates and
decrease dropout rates for the poor – reported an increase in primary school attendance
for girls by 1.3 percentage points and secondary school enrolment for girls by 10.7
percent.129
Households have also reported an improvement in the quality of education as it
elevates the intrinsic value of education in beneficiary households.130 While some
households have reported that the financial assistance that comes with CCT has eased the
burden of paying for school fees, in some households, socio-cultural factors remain
deeply entrenched that the benefits associated with the CCT has not influenced the
parents’ perspective regarding education (especially for girls).131 However, in other cases,
the effect of education seems to have trickled down to empower women. Some mothers
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have reported that CCT has increased their bargaining power when advocating for their
daughter’s education, and that the family will lose the benefits if their daughters are not
sent to school.132 Moreover, since women are often the direct beneficiaries of CCT cash
transfers, Turkey’s program has reasserted the role of motherhood in households and
“had positive effect on women’s interaction and socialization.133”
Impact on education also has spillover effects on child labor. There are two main
channels through which this occurs: the first channel is that the time spent in school
means that children have less time available to work; and the second channel is that the
cash transfer acts as a substitute income to households so that they become less
dependent on the children’s income.134 In Mexico, an evaluation of Oportunidades
reveals that child work is reduced among older children aged 12 to 17, especially among
boys, and domestic work is also substantially reduced among girls.
Impact on healthcare
CCTs have led to improvements in usage of healthcare services, and have started
to change attitudes towards healthcare in certain countries. Studies have shown
improvements in preventive infant care, pregnancy checkups, post-birth, and early
childhood health checkups.135 “Studies reveal positive effects on use of preventive infant
care, checkups during pregnancy, after birth and in early childhood.136” For example,
Mexico’s Oportunidades program finds that beneficiary households in Mexican villages
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tend to use public health services than non-beneficiaries.137 However, most CCT program
evaluations reveal mixed outcomes in terms of CCTs impact on health outcomes.
For example, an evaluation of Mexico’s Progresa also shows a significant
increase in nutrition monitoring and immunization rates, finding that participating infants
up to two years old showed an increase in growth monitoring visits by 25 to 60 percent, a
4.7 percentage points reduction in illness rates (12 percent lower than baseline value).138
On the other hand, an evaluation of the Bolsa Alimentacao (one part of the Bolsa Familia
pre-consolidation) in Brazil “had no meaningful effects on preschool nutritional status,
blood hemoglobin levels and rates of anemia.139” Moreover, it is harder to monitor
compliance and evaluate outcomes of CCT programs’ impact on health, because in poor
areas there tends to be a greater service supply constraint in healthcare than in education.
Similarly, it also requires a higher degree of physical and human resources to maintain a
health center than it does to run a school.140
The impact on healthcare is seen more visibly in Turkey, where health transfers
from the CCT program increased the full immunization rate for pre-school children by
13.6 percent and the full immunization rate for infants “against tuberculosis, tetanus,
polio and measles jumped from 43.8 percent to 57.6 percent.141” An interesting finding
from Turkey reveals that by encouraging women to conduct regulated health check-ups,
the probability of a woman of childbearing age (16-49) to become pregnant has been
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reduced by about 2-3 percent.142 However, pre-existing socio-cultural expectations may
also affect the way households view vaccinations and health care centers. For example, in
some cases in Turkey, vaccinations are suspected to be a harmful practice that may lead
to infertility.143
Impact on conflict
A study by Crost, Felter & Johnston (2014) is one of the few studies currently
available that looks at the effect of CCTs on civil conflict in the Philippines.144 Their
analysis uses a randomized World Bank experience in which 130 villages were divided
into treatment and control group and comparing that to a village-level dataset on conflict
incidents. The result of their study indicates that “cash transfers caused a substantial
decrease in conflict-related incidents in treatment villages relative to control villages.145”
Another spillover effect is that CCT programs increase the opportunity cost of joining
rebel groups, making it less likely for beneficiaries to be recruited to join rebel groups
and to “export combatants to carry out attacks in other villages.146” Interestingly, another
study by Crost, Felter and Johnston (2012) found that civil conflict increased in barely
eligible households in a community-driven development program due to increased
insurgent-initiated incidents during the early stages of program preparation. Their results
are consistent with the idea that insurgents would “appropriate program’s resources by
violent means” and/or “sabotage program because its success would weaken [the
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program’s] support in the population.147” The differences between the impact of CCT and
community-driven development programs on conflict might be due to the fact that
community-driven development projects are more highly visible (e.g. they are typically
small infrastructure projects) and are easier targets to attack by ineligible groups. On the
other hand, the cash disbursements received in a CCT is often transferred directly (e.g.
through electronic transfers), making it difficult to target the program or program
beneficiaries using violence.148
Moreover, Chioda, Mello and Soares (2012) finds a negative relationship between
Bolsa Familia and Crime in Urban Brazil, suggesting that “the main effect works through
increased household income or changed peer group, rather than from incapacitation from
time spent in school.149”
Challenges to CCTs
While the exact CCT policies and implementation vary among countries, there
remains common challenges that exist within all of the different CCT programs.
Targeting dilemma
One of the most common challenges that CCT programs initially face is creating
an effective targeting mechanism. CCT programs differ in how they determine initial
eligibility for the program.
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In Brazil, Bolsa Familia determines eligibility based on “declared income and not
based on proxy means test.150” Geographic targeting comes in two stages. At the first
level, the federal government initially allots program quotas to municipalities based on
poverty estimates. The original municipal allocations are then determined by comparing
eligibility criteria (income higher than R$100 – approx. US$48) to the national household
survey.151 At the second level, municipalities use indices of living standards to locate
geographic concentrations of the poor. These quotas are only to determine Bolsa
Familia’s program benefits, and not “registration quotas152, which were used in initial
years of the pre-reform programs.153” Having a quota for program benefits, combined
with formal and social control, could potentially act as a self-regulating mechanism to
ensure that municipalities focus on only giving the benefits to those who need them the
most, and “reduce incentives for the ‘moral hazard’ in excess registration by
municipalities.154”
After the geographic locations are established, the program then uses a meanstesting mechanism to determine family eligibility for Bolsa Familia. Moreover, family
eligibility is determined centrally, based on household registry data that are “collected
locally and transmitted into a central database known as the Cadastro Unico.155” The
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Cadastro Unico is an inclusive list that includes all registered families regardless of their
eligibility for the program. The Ministry of Social Development then verifies information
and establishes eligibility and finalizes the list of the program’s beneficiary payroll.156 An
initial assessment of Bolsa Familia’s targeting system finds that the program is
“extremely well-targeted.157” The poorest 25 percent of the population received 80
percent of the benefits, 85 percent of the “leakages” went to the near-poor households,
and “virtually none” went to the richest quartile of the population.158 The improvement in
targeting likely comes from the creation of geographic targeting within municipalities
and the reforms to strengthen the Cadastro Unico.
In another example, the Philippine government – realizing that inefficient
targeting system could lead to leakages, low program impact, and wasted public
resources – developed the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction
to identify the poor in social welfare programs and poverty interventions.159 The
Philippines’ CCT program, more commonly known as the Pantawid Pamilyan Pilipino
Program (4P), is the first social-welfare program in the Philippines to adopt the newly
established targeting mechanism.160 There are three stages to the targeting system:
geographical targeting, household assessment, and validation of identified households. In
the geographical targeting stage, the poorest 20 provinces are selected, out of which
eligible districts are set based on the municipalities’ poverty incidence.161 Unlike Brazil,
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during the second stage of household assessment, the Philippines uses a proxy means test
(PMT), which estimates income and household expenditures with socioeconomic
indicators at the household level.162 Through a series of interviews, households are asked
questions regarding household consumption, education of household members,
occupation, housing conditions, access to basic services, ownership of assets and tenure
status of housing. Using a regression analysis, proxy means test creates a cut-off point for
households to determine eligibility by calculating a proxy income or expenditure per
household.163
Mexico’s Oportunidades program employs similar targeting method to that of the
Philippines. Using both geographical targeting and proxy means tests, the program
conducts household surveys in eligible communities.164 To build on its credibility,
Oportunidades has a “rigorous, ongoing evaluation process, with the first stage
administered by an external and independent organization, the International Food Policy
Research Institute.165” Specifically, in the urban areas, the targeting process begins by
identifying eligible households within marginalized localities. Then, “national
socioeconomic information from household surveys is used to identify the poorest areas
and a marginalization index is constructed for each area and neighborhood.166” After
selecting the most marginalized areas, eligible households are then identified within each
area. In contrast, Oportunidades employs a different targeting system for rural areas, in
which the targeting process involves more of a community effort. After establishing a
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poverty score for each household through a series of socio-economic questionnaires, the
final list of eligible households is discussed at a community meeting.167
As for Turkey’s methodology process, which also adopts the proxy means test,
the targeting process starts with an application from the prospective beneficiaries, who
are assisted by Foundation officials, teachers, health personnel and shopkeepers. Final
applications are decided in Ankara, Turkey’s capital, which raises concerns about overcentralization and over-involvement of the central government.168 Additionally, having
an application process hinders certain groups of people to apply due to lack of
knowledge, lack of support in the application process, legal marriage obstacle, language
barriers and the belief that only a limited number of applicants will be accepted.169
Budget stabilization
With most social welfare policies, the issue of budget stabilization remains one of
the biggest challenges. It is important to create effective strategies to ensure that
taxpayers and government officials would continue to maintain support of these programs
to ensure sustainability. Consequently, “the immediate challenge is to convince finance
ministers and governments generally that [cash transfers] are not simply hand-outs but
necessary social investments.170 To increase budget stabilization in cash transfer
programs, it is important to look at their legal frameworks. The two different cash
transfer programs in Brazil – the continuous cash benefit (BPC) and the Bolsa Familia –
highlight these differences quite starkly. From a legal standpoint, the BPC is incorporated
167
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in the 1988 constitution and regulated by the legislation, whereas the Bolsa Familia was
“created through a presidential provisional measure, afterwards transformed into law.171”
Thus, benefits of BPC are considered to be a constitutional right, whereas eligibility in
Bolsa Familia is more discretionary. Given the constitutional nature of the BPC, it is not
as vulnerable to budget cuts and other short-term changes in the economy as the Bolsa
Familia is. Because Bolsa Familia is rooted in a predominantly political – and not legal –
origin, “any fluctuation in the political scenario might … affect its permanence or future
expansions.172” Indeed, a study analyzing the political impact of CCT in Indonesia finds
that “the CCT program increases vote shares for legislative candidates from the
incumbent president’s party, improves households’ satisfaction with kabupaten-level
government administrative services, and decreases competition among presidential
candidates as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.173”
One potential solution is to institutionalize CCT programs and establish a
consensus that CCT programs are not affiliated with a “single government program” but
are part of the country’s policy to strengthen social protection and poverty-reduction
strategies.174 Having strong support from a particular administration is complicated
because on the one hand it does facilitate implementation, but, once administrations
change, its high association with the previous administration might compromise its
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sustainability.175 Institutionalizing cash transfer programs would allow the programs to be
more transparent and to have a clearly defined financing stage and legal framework.176
Such example can be found in the case of the Philippines, where the House
Committee on Appropriations recently approved the funding provision to institutionalize
its CCT program, the 4Ps, to cover 60 percent of the country’s extremely poor, under the
“Lingap Pamilya Act of 2015.”.177 Previously, the CCT program was introduced by
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2008. Institutionalizing the program not
only will broaden coverage and increase funding, but will also disassociate it with a
single government and instead incorporate it as a bigger national plan to reduce poverty
and strengthen social protection in the country.
Given that the impoverished population tends to be in a disadvantaged position in
the budget distribution of a political power game, it is important for CCT administrators
to highlight the importance of cash transfers as a way to boost consumption, which could
then trigger investment.178 The importance of communicating CCT’s benefits to create a
stronger legitimacy of the program is also found in Honduras – where the CCT
administrators were so preoccupied in implementing the program that they did not
sufficiently communicate its success to domestic stakeholders.179 A lesson to be learned
in ensuring budget stabilization from this case is to make sure that a strong public
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relations campaign is established to create a higher awareness of its accomplishments to
government officials.180
In the case of Mexico, program administrators took a more proactive approach in
ensuring budget stabilization by planning an initial evaluation from the very beginning of
the program.181 Having an independent academic organization evaluate the program also
helps to strengthen their credibility and reduce the possibility of budget cuts.182 Of course,
to ensure budget stabilization, an ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of each dollar
funneled into the program is also essential. An evaluation of Progresa revealed that “the
administrative costs of delivering cash transfers to poor households appear to be small
(Mex$8.9 for every Mex$100 allocated to the program) relative to the costs of previous
Mexican programs and to targeted programs in other countries.183”
Importance of scalability
For CCT programs to be successful it has to be scalable and reach a wide scope of
beneficiaries. Generally, cash transfers create a bigger impact on the local economy than
the aggregate economy because of “the limited scale of most programs” and “the low
absolute value of the transfer.184” Thus, for the impact of cash transfers to be significant,
it requires a much larger institutional capacity and bigger budget in order to create a
greater impact and better coordination across government agencies.185
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A study by the Overseas Development Institute also found that increasing the
scale of these programs could change consumption patterns within the households.
“Small, regular cash transfers are spent mainly on consumption, but larger, lump sum
transfers are most likely to be spent on productive activities if stipends are provided
simultaneously to support immediate consumption needs.186”
A World Bank study on the Philippines also recommends that health service
providers be strengthened to ensure continuity of the healthcare extending beyond the
program. The study also found that coverage may have to be extended to more than the
current five years to see a sizeable impact.187 The Philippine case also raises the
importance of a smooth transfer to a graduation program. Currently, the Philippine
government is working with the Asian Development Bank to create an exit strategy and
proposing the idea that beneficiaries who graduate the CCT program would be referred to
other social welfare programs.188
Graduation strategy
The short time-frame of most CCT programs creates a paradox in which it has a
long-term goal of sustaining human capital accumulation, but these programs only retain
the beneficiaries for a maximum of five years.189 Therefore, it is important to take note of
effective exit strategies and graduation program to ensure that “graduated” families are
not vulnerable to sudden economic shocks. The creation of an exit strategy is to avoid
186
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dependence on the program and ensure that it creates more room for other eligible
families.190
CCT programs were never created to be a once-and-for-all measure to eliminate
poverty, and thus exiting CCT programs does not mean that recipients have “escaped”
poverty. Exiting the CCT programs means redirecting them to other programs that would
improve their living standards and guarantee their social rights that would allow them to
eventually escape from poverty in the long-term.191 Thus, in the short-term, graduation
from CCT programs means that households are strong enough that they are able to
weather a certain level of economic shocks. The transition should link them to other
interventions if necessary.192 Creating a graduation scheme remains challenging given the
perception that cash transfers are targeted toward the non-productive population in
society, implying their “ongoing dependence” on the program, while at the same time the
program is marketed as a “short-term intervention offering a mechanism for
graduation.193”
Such an example can be found in Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program, which was
created to be an income supplementation program, and not the only source of income for
its beneficiaries.194 Bolsa Familia administrators realize that one program cannot be
responsible for eradicating poverty, and that it requires a concerted effort from various
government agencies to create a series of programs that will ultimately lead to a
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significant boost in economic growth.195 Brazilian lenders have examined graduation
strategies as “expansion strategies” to create a bridge from Bolsa Familia to other
programs. Similarly, Mexico’s Oportunidades program created a plan that would allow
beneficiary families to remain in the program, by using a reassessment plan conducted
three years following their admission to the program.196
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Chapter 3 – Conditioning factors
There are several conditioning factors that are crucial in our understanding of how
and why CCT programs can be helpful in improving people’s lives and reducing conflict.
One of the promising goals of CCT programs is its focus on both short-term and longterm development. Underlying these goals are several assumptions that support CCT as a
successful intervention to boost education and health rates in the countries in which it
operates.
Among them is the assumption that investing on education and health care helps
to reduce poverty. On the micro level, this assumption may hold true as many lowincome households are often stuck in a perpetual poverty trap, whereby without outside
intervention, low-income households tend to stay poor. Similarly, this idea is also seen in
the education trap, whereby individuals who received little to no education are unable to
get higher-paying jobs, and are often stuck in low-paying jobs, which make it harder to
increase savings and investments in other areas in their lives.
By investing in education and making it more accessible, the program offers lowincome individuals – who might otherwise be stuck in low-paying jobs – an opportunity
to hone their skills and increase their capabilities so that they are able to compete with
other people for higher-paying jobs. Investing in education is also an especially important
intervention with respect to the role of women in society. Given that the primary
beneficiaries of CCTs are often women, it gives them higher bargaining power and
allows them more opportunities to determine the allocation of spending within the
household. In some cases, women have used the additional cash as a successful
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bargaining tool to ensure that their children are able to attend school and get regular
health checkups. On a macro level, when the citizens of a country are more educated and
are healthier, the country as a whole benefit from higher levels of economic productivity
and lower risks of unemployment and health-related problems.
It is also often assumed that being educated leads to more opportunities. Amartya
Sen put out the argument of development as freedom, and being educated means having
the freedom to think, to learn and to develop capabilities.197 Following Sen’s arguments,
developing these capabilities allow individuals to have more choice, which can extend to
choice of employment as well. However, this might not be true when individuals end up
being overqualified for the job vacancies that are available. In some cases, there might be
no job opportunities regardless of the qualifications that one has. Additionally, some
socio-cultural expectations may also hinder girls from going to school as they do not
view it as a necessity. For CCTs to maximize its impact on education, it also has to
include a counseling component to the program to advise parents and to encourage and
motivate children to want to go to school.
In a similar vein, formal education may not prepare individuals with the skills
necessary for work, which is where the role of vocational training comes in. CCT
programs typically only encourage enrolment in traditional forms of schooling, thus
leaving out non-traditional schooling options. In some developing countries, vocational
training often provides students with a more practical sets of skills that are valuable in
finding employment post-graduation. If CCT programs want to produce students who are
197
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able to find a job later on, they may have to start including vocational training and
encouraging students to look into vocational training options.
Moreover, as the demand for school increases – a CCT program is a demand-side
intervention – then local officials have to be able to keep up with the supply. However,
they do not always keep up with the demand. Some evaluation of CCT programs have
revealed that the quality of education can be negatively affected due to overcapacity of
students. This is especially important in areas where under-capacity of teachers and
administrators is already rampant, but also in areas where classroom and school
infrastructure is limited. The general argument that more students enrolled in schools lead
to higher levels of development can only be true when the local governments can keep up
with creating more schools. The issue then becomes very political, as the outcome of
CCT programs becomes dependent on the government’s willingness and ability to build
more schools, train more teachers, and increase the overall quality of the education.
In addition to increasing the quantity and quality schools, governments and
program officials also often overlook the infrastructure needed to get to these schools.
Physical access constraints, such as distance, poor road condition and unavailable
transportation to get students to school, can also be a great hindrance for parents to send
their children to school. In order to increase school attendance, CCT administrators
would also have to work with the appropriate government bodies to ensure that school
buildings in the area that CCT operates in are accessible by its beneficiaries.
Furthermore, although CCT programs frequently promote eligible children to
enroll in schools, which might lead to an increase in school enrolment rates, but they do
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not always equate to an increase in school retention rates. Since program administrators
can only monitor conditionality once every few months or even once a year, beneficiaries
can simply enroll their children without following through and ensuring they are retained
in the school system. In order to ensure a more thorough impact on education, CCT
programs should also measure retention rates as well as enrolment rates in schools. In
addition, CCTs may also indirectly lead to more children dropping out of school because
with the sudden increase in demand for schools, teachers could get overwhelmed and the
quality of education could be compromised.
Another aspect of schooling that CCT also often looks past is that while the cash
disbursement may be enough to cover school fees, it may not be enough to cover all the
out-of-pocket expenses of going to school, such as the cost of textbooks, uniform, and
other secondary school expenses. Some children have reported being embarrassed when
they do not have the necessary supplies, or if their “uniform is torn” or “shoes are
drenched due to flooding,” as reasons not to go to school.198 In the same way, some
children who have been out of the schooling system for a while may be struggling to keep
up with the materials, and thus may need extra help to do as well as their peers. CCT
programs would do well to have additional study sessions and tutors to help some
students transition back into the school system.
In terms of its impact on healthcare, a sudden increase in demand in healthcare
services could also reduce the quality of services being offered. A local health clinic
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could be overburdened with CCT beneficiaries and might not have the physical and
human resources to tend to all patients. Thus, for CCT programs to be successful, the
program administrators need to work with the government to ensure that it is able to
increase the number of health facilities, and to improve upon infrastructure and access to
these health care facilities. Many women have noted that health facilities are often
located far away from their house, and the road quality is unsafe for them to go on at
times.199 When governments fail to build stronger medical infrastructure and improved
sanitation facilities, the effect of some beneficiaries getting more regular check ups may
be offset with those who are unable to receive service due to lack of supply.
With the increase in demand and the awareness of the importance of health check
ups, program administrators should also work with the relevant stakeholders to educate
more people about the purpose of different vaccines and vitamins, as well as prevention
methods. For example, in many societies, false beliefs often take precedent, with some
households believing that getting their child immunized will cause a high fever.200
Healthcare services should also start being more proactive and reach out to beneficiaries,
as some of them may be reluctant to go due to traditional expectations that healthcare
providers are supposed to treat illnesses, rather than prevent them.
In many societies, men still remain the breadwinner of the family. However, the
conditions of CCT programs often exclude men as its main recipients. Often, CCT
programs would only encourage children and pregnant mothers to get regular check ups
among its criteria for conditionality. When men remain the majority of the breadwinners
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in low-income households, their sickness could significantly affect spending behaviors of
beneficiary families, and most of their assets would have to be allocated toward
healthcare spending for the men. Understandably, CCT programs tend to focus on women
and children as their needs are often excluded from household decision making.
However, encouraging working men to get health checkups could also be beneficial for
the family to ensure that its main source of income does not get cut off immediately.
Moreover, a SMERU study looking at whether conditionality is pro-women found
that cash benefits do not change the bargaining power of women in households where
women are traditionally the ones managing the household budget; thus, the role of the
women is simply seen as the “fund manager” and not the ultimate decision maker.201
Thus, CCTs need to create a balance approach by doing more to strengthen the role of
women in the program, and given the strong role of men, to involve them more in the
program.
Another benefit of CCT programs is that they aim to tackle short-term poverty
needs by giving out cash disbursements should participants follow through with all the
conditions listed. The caveat is that cash disbursements will only yield future benefits if
they are invested in education, home business, or saved for future purposes. Low-income
households are frequently put in situations where the money received would have to go to
immediate needs. Most of the money received tends to be spent on basic necessities, and
little is saved for education or health expenditure. CCT programs consider increasing the
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incentives for beneficiaries to invest the cash that they have received to start building a
savings account for themselves.
Often, the timing of the cash disbursements also matters in determining what the
money will be used for. Some CCT programs found that only when transfers arrived
shortly before school fees were due, was the money spent on these services. Thus, each
CCT has to ensure that the delivery of the cash disbursements have to be done in a timely
manner, and if possible, to coincide with school fee deadline. If in cases where schools
have different payment deadlines, CCT programs should aim to give out the
disbursements consistently every month so that families can create a better plan in
managing their household budget.
One of the critics of CCT programs also points out that giving low-income
families cash disbursements will reduce incentives for work. However, because the size
of the cash disbursements is not big enough to replace regular sources of income, families
typically do not stop working. An assessment of a government program in Uganda
(Blattman, Fiala and Martinez, 2013) in which treatment groups received unsupervised
grants of $382 per member, found that “relative to the control group, the program
increases business assets by 57 percent, work hours by 17 percent and earnings by 38
percent.202” Giving out the cash disbursements may encourage families to work even
harder, as they have an extra source of income to start investing in either their personal
and professional lives. Given the fact that CCT programs tend to target the poorest people
in the country, the nominal amount of the cash transfer might be considered “small,” but
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it has a proportionally larger value to low-income households, leading to a bigger impact
in their spending habits. Having an extra source of income could also reduce the
psychological burden of having to worry about every financial decision. These
observations are confirmed in a cross-country study by Harvard and MIT economists,
which finds “no systematic evidence that cash transfer programs discourage work” in
seven CCTs spread across Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa.203
CCT programs can also help reduce income inequality within a country by
helping low-income families invest in both short-term and long-term growth,
encouraging savings and allowing them better social mobility once they are educated and
healthy. Nonetheless, within neighboring communities, CCT programs could lead to
unintended consequences when income inequality adds to the relative deprivation of
those who were not selected as beneficiaries. A study examining the negative
psychological externalities of cash transfers on non-recipients in Kenya (Haushofer,
Reisinger and Shapiro, 2015) found that as CCT beneficiaries’ wealth increases, life
satisfaction, consumption and asset holdings of non-beneficiaries decrease. 204 They also
found that, “the decrease in life satisfaction induced by transfers to neighbors more than
offsets the direct positive effect of transfers, and is largest for individuals who did not
receive a direct transfer themselves.205” When neighboring communities, or even
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neighbors in the same community, do not receive CCT benefits, not only do the relative
increase in “wealth” affect them psychologically, but areas in which CCT operates could
see an increase in prices due to increase in demand. A GiveWell study found that “a
randomized study of the Mexican Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program finds
small increases in prices of five of 36 food items for sale in treatment villages
immediately following deployment of the cash transfers.” Additionally, if local
governments are not able to keep up with the increase in demand, it could lower the
quality of education and health services to non-beneficiaries as well. The tension between
recipients and non-recipients can be especially important to watch in areas where there is
already historical precedent of racial, ethnic or religious tensions within the community.
In addition to improving people’s lives, CCT programs can also help reduce
conflict in the areas in which they operate. First of all, in many circumstances,
employment may reduce the incentives for people to engage in insurrection. A World
Bank report cited “unemployment and idleness” as a main factor in youths joining rebel
or gang movements.206 Thus, if CCTs encourages more youths to get educated, thereby
increasing their chances of getting employed, then it is likely that being employed might
counter these incentives as it would take up most of their idle time. The report further
stated that joining rebel organizations or movements makes youths “feel more secure or
powerful,” which can arguably be reduced by employment.207 Being employed and
feeling like one is a productive member of society can reduce incentives to join these
movements. The caveat is that the factors leading people to join militant ideological
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movements may be different, and CCT programs might not be able to have an impact on
reducing incentives to join these kinds of militant ideological groups.
Similarly, many studies have looked into the role of education itself in reducing
incentives for people to engage in criminal activity. Studies have found that “schooling
may have long-term effects on criminal behavior through wages and preferences, and
therefore, through the relative attractiveness of criminal activities and the cost of
expected punishment.208” Additionally, the physical time spent in school may also curb
incentives and reduce opportunities for youths to engage in criminal and risky behavior.
Given that youths account for a disproportionately high fraction of crime-related
activities, CCTs may have a unique position in reducing conflict in the areas that they
operate in. In Sao Paulo, for example, “between 20 percent and 25 percent of robberies,
thefts and motor vehicle crimes are supposedly committed by individuals below age
18.209” Another related study also found that CCTs could have potential crime-reducing
effect as one of its impacts on vulnerable youths.210
Additionally, the regular cash disbursements also could have a direct impact on
criminal behavior. Having a boost in their regular income creates an ability to buy other
household items, which in turn reduce the incentive to engage in financially-motivated
crimes. This is backed up with numerous studies, arguing that the effect of the amount
and timing of welfare payments has a negative impact on the total number of crimes.211
Moreover, CCTs may also reduce conflict as it increases the opportunity cost of criminal
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behavior, in terms of individual crimes. If individuals realize that they could increase
their income by meeting the CCT eligibility guidelines, then they might not want to
engage in criminal activity anymore. Having a selection process ensures that potential
applicants have a clean record so that they would be able to make it pass the selection
process, thus, making criminal behavior less attractive.
However, while the correlation between CCTs and crime rates may be more clearcut, in some cases, CCTs may exacerbate conflict when program designers and
administrators do not adequately take into account pre-existing racial and ethnic tension.
This is especially relevant during the beneficiary selection process, and depending on
how each program administrator carries out the targeting method, the process and
outcome could unintentionally or intentionally sideline certain race or religious groups.
If, for example, the district or village head, who has an important role in determining the
list of beneficiaries, belongs to a certain racial, ethnic or religious group, they may favor
applicants who belong to the same group. In some cases, it also could be that the nonbeneficiaries who belong to a different identity group would want to “sabotage” the CCT
program during its implementation to undermine its position. However, this problem
could be partly mitigated by ensuring that the benefits that are distributed to the
households directly through beneficiaries’ bank accounts. By ensuring that the benefits
are distributed in a more private way also helps to reduce the perception of bias by nonbeneficiaries.
Therefore, the selection process of CCT programs ought not include only
stakeholders who represent the same identity groups. Having a group that reflects the
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variety of different interests in the same community will also create a higher sense of
accountability for everyone involved. If only one person, or one group of a particular
identity group is in charge, then the enormous room for autonomy permits nepotism and
corruption within the implementation of the program. If there is no measure to ensure that
diverse interests are represented, poverty-alleviation efforts can lead to increased social
tension and violence, which can ultimately undermine economic growth and the intended
poverty-alleviation efforts.
In a similar vein, therefore, determining eligibility ought not to be done in a
communal process, as it might leave room for non-related reasons to cloud people’s
judgments (e.g. neighbors having disagreement with one another) and may in fact deepen
conflict that happens at a community level. If a group of people help to determine
eligibility, their inputs should be monitored and ought not be the ultimate determinant in
selecting participants. Thus, in order to promote a fair selection process, a clear-cut
guideline should ensure that the process is fair to everyone. However, it is also important
to keep in mind that in areas where households’ incomes are all in a similar range (e.g. in
more equal societies where everyone is generally equally as poor), everyone should be
deemed eligible because if the cut-off point is taken too strictly, it may create further
tension within the community.
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Chapter 4a – Comparison of CCTs to other Social Protection Programs (SPPs)
One way to understand the effectiveness of CCTs is to compare its performance
with that of the other government programs. These other government programs are
generally under the category of “social protection programs,” which is often defined as,
“a collection of programs that address risk, vulnerability, inequality, and poverty through
a system of transfers in cash or in kind (Fiszbein, Kanbur, and Yemtsov, 2013).212” Most
of these programs are created as insurances, to allow households to invest in human and
physical capital, and improve household’s social risk management.213 Generally, social
protection programs include: conditional and unconditional cash transfers, school
feeding, social pensions for elderly, disability assistance, family and child allowances,
and in-kind benefits such as food stamps and other vouchers. Most of these programs
have been implemented in Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, as
well as East Asia and the Pacific.
The creation of such programs is driven by the need to address extreme poverty
and rising inequality. As such, developing countries have expanded their social protection
programs and established numerous cash transfer programs focusing on low-income
households and marginalized groups in society. The need to expand social protection
programs is also embodied in the UN Social Protection Floor Initiative (ILO 2011),
which calls on countries to strengthen their social protection programs and recognize it as
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an international human right. Currently, social protection programs globally are
preventing 150 million people from falling into poverty.214
Fiszbein even goes so far as to arguing that social protection should be present in
the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals as a key element of the discourse.215 Part
of the reasons why many scholars are arguing for the development of social protection
programs is due to rising inequality in many developing countries that are inhibiting its
poverty-reduction goals. In Asia, calculations have shown that if inequality had not risen,
“economic growth could have lifted almost 250 million people out of poverty over the
last two decades.216” Similarly, in Brazil between 1998 and 2009, if inequality had not
risen, annual growth could have been four percentage points higher.217 An outlier to this
trend is other Latin American economies, though this could be explained by the fact that
since 2000, these countries have focused its efforts on developing social protection
programs.218
Moreover, social protection programs have been on the forefront of povertyreduction agenda given that some of the risks and vulnerabilities faced by the poor are
not fully captured in standard poverty statistics. Thus, if dimensions of vulnerability and
risks are adjusted in poverty measures, then current poverty measures “may understate
actual poverty.219” A more indirect effect can be seen in the way that these vulnerabilities
expose the poor to remain in poverty, health, education traps as they may lose out on
long-term benefits when there are other pressing short-term needs in the family. For
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example, babies who do not receive enough nutrition in their early years cannot be
compensated with improved nutrition in their later years.220
Knowledge gaps and challenges in impact evaluations of SPPs
In trying to rank various social protection programs, the challenge arises due to
the different objectives, locations and program administrators (e.g. NGOs, international
donors, or a branch of the government) of the program. Another limitation is that most
impact evaluations of social protection programs are heavily concentrated on conditional
cash transfers, school feeding and workfare programs, thus, not much is known about the
impact of other programs such as employment and wage subsidies, unconditional cash
transfers, disability benefits, food aid, family and child allowances, and general
subsidies.221 Most of these evaluations also focus on short-term effects (e.g. utilization of
education and health services), but less so on long-term effects and outcomes of increased
usage of these services. Given these differences, it becomes challenging to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis that would take into account all of the different objectives, locations
and administrators of the programs. In the impact evaluation carried out by the World
Bank, for example, only a quarter of the SPPs are included in the cost-benefit analysis.222
Nonetheless, Fiszbein Kanbur and Yemtsov (2013) have tried to create a graph of
cost-benefit ratio for various types of social protection programs, ranging from zero to
one, with one being the perfect standard for SPPs. They found that on average, the cost-
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benefit ratio is above zero, and a score of 0.5, for example, means that for every dollar of
transfer that goes to the beneficiary, at least 50 cents is going to fill the poverty gap.223224

Source: Fiszbein, Kanbur, and Yemstov (2014)
Interestingly, the graph reveals that there is no direct correlation between program
type and efficiency in reducing the poverty gap. The distribution of the cost-benefit ratio
for cash transfers, social pensions and family/child or disability allowances look very
similar, with the majority of the programs having a cost-benefit ratio between 0.3 and 0.6.
However, out of all the social protection programs, CCTs tend to have the highest
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efficiency in reducing poverty as it is the only SPP that has a cost-benefit ratio that stands
relatively higher at 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8. On the other hand, the least efficient programs seem
to be “other programs” – which often includes subsidies and social services – and public
works or cash-for-work. One important thing to note when looking at the rate of return is
that one program might have a higher BCR but its impacts may not be directed toward
low-income households, thereby affecting its effectiveness in reducing poverty.
The impact on poverty and income can most directly be felt by in kind or cash
transfers, which can immediately transfer purchasing power to the beneficiaries.225
Another benefit of cash transfers is that it acts as an insurance against shocks and can be
invested for future needs. This indirect effect is not available in other SPPs, especially
those programs with benefits that are less tangible and transferable for other needs
(school feeding program, subsidies and food stamps). Increasing the targeting efficiency
of these SPPs is important as the median social protection program transfers 12 times the
poverty gap (assuming an international extreme poverty line of $1.25/day), which shows
the potential that SPPs have in reducing poverty.226
The 2011 World Bank evaluation shows that nine out of 11 programs227 have
been shown to be effective in reducing the number of people below the poverty line.
Though the magnitude of impact fluctuates as poverty headcount is mostly measured
through changes in consumption behavior. Moreover, “six out of nine evaluations
suggested that workfare, UCT, and CCT programs lead to a net increase in short-term
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household income, the majority of which is in direct response to the transfers.228”
Increases in income may allow households to expand and invest in their economic
activities and to have more disposable income to increase consumption and savings.
Some studies have found that effect on income can be negative in cases where a
reduction of child labor reduces the family’s income, and the effects of encouraging
children to go to school will not be felt in the short-term.229 However, simulation analyses
have been used to identify the effects of short-term investments on future earnings; which
found that the impact of SPPs on income growth happens through two main channels:
school attainment and improved nutrition and health.230
Comparing impacts on consumption
The effect on consumption varies according to the size of the transfer itself. “Ten
of 14 evaluations indicated that CCT, UCT, workfare and food aid programs increase
short-term consumption.231” Some of the short-term effect on consumption is often
carried through in the long-term as well. Two workfare programs in Colombia (Empleo
en Accion) and Ethiopia (Employment Generating Scheme) have shown that
beneficiaries’ consumption continues to increase even after nine to 18 months after
exiting the program. 232 Similar results are also found in two CCT programs in Colombia
and Mexico, whose beneficiaries are shown to increase consumption after two years and
five and a half years, respectively, after joining the program.233 They have also found that
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with programs that show no short-term impact on consumption – such as China’s
unconditional cash transfer program – also do not reveal any changes in the long-term.234
Comparing impacts on education
Several SPPs such as CCTs, school feeding, and education fee waivers have been
found to increase usage of educational services. This is partly attributed to the fact that
these programs condition such inputs, though increased usage does not always result in
equal educational outcomes. An interesting outlier is UCTs, which does not necessarily
tell beneficiaries to spend cash benefits on education, have positive impacts on increased
school attendance.235 Upon closer examination, the size of impact is also larger for
secondary school than primary school, which could be attributed to the fact that primary
school attendance has generally been the focus of many governments. Thus, to increase
cost-benefit ratio of these programs, SPPs should look into focusing its efforts on
secondary-level education where there are greater needs to be filled.236
The predominance of CCTs in in these impact evaluations also skew the result to
show that there is positive impact in at least 70 percent of the studies that measure the
outcome of grade progression, repetition and dropouts (mostly in primary school).237
Nonetheless, this seems to suggest that there is value to assigning conditionalities on
regular attendance. Furthermore, while CCTs have been found to increase attendance and
reduce dropout rates, its impact on learning outcomes is vaguer. Looking at changes in
test scores, these impact evaluations have found mixed results. For example, two CCTs in
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Colombia and Cambodia do not see significant changes on test scores, whereas two CCTs
in Argentina and Malawi are seen to improve beneficiaries’ grades and college entrance
exam scores.238 Mexico’s Oportunidades program also found that participants see
improved scores in some subjects but not others, thus, there is not yet a clear relationship
between SPPs and effect on learning outcomes for older children.239
Comparing impacts on child labor
One of the observed indirect effects of SSN programs is a reduction of child
labor, which happens as a result of increased participation in schools for children.
Moreover, 13 out of 19 programs evaluated in the World Bank report found positive
impacts in reduction of child labor, which included “six conventional CCTs, two CCTs
that exclusively target girls in Cambodia and Pakistan, two school feeding programs in
Bangladesh and Burkina Faso, one UCT in Ecuador, and two education fee waiver
programs in Colombia and Indonesia.240” Another important finding is that even if
parents do not withdraw children completely from income-generating jobs, the number of
hours worked can be reduced as a result of money received from the transfer; thus,
children can devote more time for education.241
Comparing impacts on health and nutrition
The most explicit positive effect in increased usage of healthcare facilities comes
from CCT recipients, which require its beneficiaries to do so in order to receive the
transfer. However, most of the increased usage of healthcare facilities have yet to
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translate to better health and nutritional status for children.242 Most of the programs
evaluated in the evaluation showed positive impacts, except for a UCT program in
Ecuador.243 One of the challenges of measuring health outcomes is different measures
used – some looked at increased visitation to health centers, and others focused on uses of
preventive treatments. However, since most of the evaluated programs include visits to
health centers as part of their requirements, the evaluations end up becoming a “measure
[of] compliance with program rules.244”
In terms of health outcomes, most of the social protection programs (SPPs) have
shown mixed and limited results. Only the Mexican CCT program, Oportunidades,
showed a reduction in infant mortality (two fewer deaths per thousand births).245 In terms
of effects on prevalence of diarrhea, anemia and parasitic infestations among young
children, there is mixed evidence showing five positive impacts and five with no impact
at all. As for health outcomes that are not part of the objective of the program (referring
to CCTs), hardly any effect is observed. For example, “less than half of the evaluations
found any significant increase in the rates of immunization for children under six years
old.246” In addition, only three evaluations looked into the effect of SSNs on adult health
– Mexico's CCT, Mexico’s housing subsidy and South Africa’s pension scheme – but all
showed positive results.
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Cost-benefit analysis: what is the best social protection program?
Overall, while different programs showed different results with respect to their
impacts on poverty, consumption, education, and health, there is a general sense of which
programs show the most impact. On reducing poverty, workfare programs, CCTs and
UCTs have been the most effective, though not by the full amount of the benefits “due to
foregone income and to parts of the transfers being saved and invested.247”
On health and education, “almost 90 percent of the impact evaluations with
evidence showed that [CCTs], education fee waiver, and school feeding programs
increase school enrollment, attendance, and school progression as well as reduce child
labor. Health care usage and growth monitoring are also enhanced through these
interventions.248”In terms of income and ability to save, some evidence seems to point
out that CCTs, UCTs, workfare programs and pension schemes are helpful in reducing
households’ credit constraints and allowing them to make “more, and better, investments
in assets and production.249” Furthermore, SSNs that target increase in income in the
short-term also could “signal adjustment in attitudes toward investments in the well-being
of household members” thereby leading to reduction in poverty among beneficiaries.250
CCTs also have many indirect effects. Most large cash benefits, including
conditional and unconditional cash transfers, appear not to crowd out private transfers.251
CCT programs have also worked to encourage more girls to attend school, thereby
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reducing prevalence of early marriage and childbirth.252 One of the advantages of cash
transfers is the income effect, which increases the budget of households and give them
greater flexibility in their purchasing power. Cash transfers are also administratively
simpler to manage than in-kind transfers. In some cases, in-kind transfers may be the way
through which policymakers impose their own perception of what types of goods lowincome household needs, and may indirectly distort prices.253 In-kind transfers are also
more costly to deliver and create additional challenges in its implementation. On the
other hand, cash transfers are more cost effective and “a cheaper vehicle to deliver
benefits compared to in-kind benefits.254” Cash transfers also ensure that policymakers do
not distort consumption and impose more consumption on certain goods they deem more
valuable or necessary.255 Cash transfers expand each household’s purchasing power and
their ability to choose how to best spend the money. In addition, cash is easier to transfer
than in-kind goods, which means that it could reduce the potential for conflict in certain
areas (e.g. a truck carrying food products could easily be hijacked by groups of nonbeneficiaries).
There are, however, certain situations in which cash might not be the best
solution. These are circumstances at times of wars or natural disasters, when supply of
essential goods are disrupted, when it is impossible to administer proper targeting, or in
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financial markets when cash is hard to move.256 Aside from these extreme circumstances,
cash is appropriate to use in situations of chronic poverty, in situations when the poor can
access financial facilities and when there is a strong market for the things that they could
buy with the money.
Moreover, the role of conditionalities among SSN programs has resulted in higher
efficiency in programs such as CCTs, school feeding programs, and workfare programs.
“It is expected that the ‘price’ effects induced by these conditions will affect the behavior
of those beneficiaries on the margin.257” Certain programs, such as CCTs in Malawi and
Mexico, and a UCT in Ecuador, show that imposing conditionalities increased the
likelihood that beneficiaries’ children are enrolled in school.258 Another example,
Argentina’s CCT program, shows that when future receipt of scholarship is conditional
upon academic performance, the impacts are larger.259 However, to date, whether the
higher marginal effect of conditional programs outweighs its costs of enforcement is still
a question to be investigated.
Additionally, given the importance of employment in reducing poverty, more
weight should be given to SPPs that lead to higher employment. SPPs with links to
employment include: guaranteed work programs, unemployment insurance,
unconditional income triggered by poverty and/or inability to work, unconditional food
subsidies, and conditional cash transfers. On the other hand, some SPPs have been shown
to help the poor the least, such as subsidies and contributory pension plans. Contributory
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pension plans exclude those who are outside of the formal economy, and especially given
that low-income families often do not have jobs for which pensions exist. Furthermore, it
also gives out benefits that may not target the most vulnerable (e.g. older people who had
earned a high income may have savings that they can use).
Why cash transfer is the best SPP
Thus, given the importance of cash transfers and the role of conditionalities in
SPPs, conditional cash transfers seem to satisfy most of the criteria and have some of the
biggest impacts. This is in line with the benefit-cost ratio study, which shows that CCTs
have the most potential to have the highest benefit out of every dollar that is invested in
the program.260 Politically, CCTs induce “the principle of shared responsibility” which
leads to a higher political appeal and broader political support for CCTs by all parties in
countries such as Brazil and Mexico. The attractiveness of CCT has also spread to over
50 countries around the world, and is one of the most extensively evaluated SSN
programs in the world.261
In addressing poverty and increasing human capital investment, a CCT is also
more optimal than UCT. Though the cash amount may be the same, UCT merely raises a
household’s level of permanent income, but does nothing to induce parents to invest more
in their children’s education or health status. On the other hand, CCTs’ conditionality
aspect helps shift the favor toward human capital investment that may benefit the
children more in the future. In addition, within the household, the parents’ interests may
take precedent over those of the children’s, and parents may discount the future benefit of
260
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schooling at a higher rate, thus demanding ”less schooling than the child’s optimal.262”
Moreover, in households where women have less bargaining power, CCT is more
powerful in ensuring women’s voice are more heard in making household spending and
time allocation decisions.263
While the targeting methods used by CCT programs can be improved, its
beneficiaries are targeted at those with the lowest income in society, arguably the most
vulnerable people in society. Larger CCT programs usually only cost about 0.4 percent of
GDP, and CCTs tend to replace other more expensive and less efficient programs.264 In
light of other government programs, such as pension systems which can take up as much
as four percent of GDP (which does not always target low-income households).265 Given
the breadth of its scope, CCTs also have the potential to consolidate other less-efficient
programs, such as in-kind transfers (e.g. Mexico) and energy subsidies (e.g. Brazil and
Indonesia).266
In addition, cash transfers also fare better than direct investment in public
infrastructure, which has been seen as an effective way to generate economic
development, as public expenditure on infrastructure often fails to reach those that need it
most. For example, in Nicaragua, a program seeking to expand access to electricity could
only reach a small subset of low-income households as only 10 percent of the poorest
households had access to electricity, as opposed to the extensive coverage available to the
richest households (more than 90 percent). Likewise, Mexico’s electricity subsidies in
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2000 also had “a regressive incidence.”267 Cash transfers more directly target the poor in
a way that is both more efficient and more equitable. Moreover, other market intervention
to reduce poverty may not be as effective in reducing poverty as poor people are often
prevented from being as productive as they could be in an imperfect market environment.
General macroeconomic intervention to boost the economy also might not reach the poor
given the inequality that exists in the way that women, ethnic or religious minorities, do
not have the same level of access to opportunities. Given this “inequality of opportunity,”
CCTs are in a better position to address these inequalities and reach these segments of the
population in a way that is more equitable for all.
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Chapter 4b – Comparing CCTs to Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs)
The role of Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs)
There is no discounting the role of generating employment in boosting economic
growth. Government interventions in this field can take the form of Active Labor Market
Programs (ALMPs), defined as, “selective interventions by the government in the pursuit
of efficiency and/or equity objectives, acting directly or indirectly to provide work to, or
increase employability of people with certain disadvantages in the labor market.” ALMPs
are a more active form of labor market policies as opposed to unemployment insurance
that acts as an income replacement. These interventions take the form of direct
employment, livelihood or enterprise development and employment services. Another
way that the government can generate employment is by investing in companies to hire
more people or investing a certain amount of money to build up a particular industry.
While not discounting the role of employment in generating economic growth, it is hard
to find what the implications are on broader alternatives. To date, there is no evaluation
that compares the rate of return of social protection programs and employmentgenerating programs. Thus, SPPs and ALMPs cannot be compared quantitatively and can
only be analyzed separately.
Evaluation of ALMPs
There are four different types of ALMPs, including labor market training, job
subsidies, direct job creation (e.g. public works), job search assistance, and counseling.
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Overall, past evaluations have shown that ALMPs’ positive impact tends to be
outweighed by substantial deadweight costs and displacement effects.268
Labor market training has produced mixed results. Even though it typically
increases the productivity of the labor force and is helpful when the economy is
expanding, it requires good targeting mechanisms and is a relatively costly program to
implement. It also typically favors the most skilled workers with the highest labor market
prospects.269 In addition, retraining program typically only helps out younger workers
and have limited impact on older workers even though both might have the same level of
education and vocational skills.270
Moreover, job subsidy programs are typically implemented during periods of high
unemployment as a way to boost certain industries. It may act as an alternative to
unemployment benefits and may even lead to more permanent employment for some
employees. Evaluations have found that they are most helpful in the short term among the
“hard-to-employ” groups.271 However, companies may use this subsidy as a way to hire
cheap labor and may have high deadweight losses and displacement effects (toward
smaller enterprises).272
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In addition, direct job creation programs, which usually take the form of public
works, are beneficial both because they can help long-term unemployment as well as
create more public goods and infrastructures. The World Bank has also found that public
work schemes are often more cost effective than subsidies. For example, the assessment
found that the Indonesian public works program spent less than $4 for each $1 transferred
as opposed to the rice subsidies program that expended $8.20 for each $1 transferred.273
Evaluation of the outcomes shows that these types of programs mostly help the most
disadvantaged groups (older workers, long term unemployed).274 However, it also
focuses on the short-term and is quite costly to implement. The jobs that they would get
also may be low skill and are not preparing them for their next jobs, and may even crowd
out private jobs.275
Furthermore, job search assistance and counseling programs are a helpful way to
help screen participants for other ALMPs from which they might benefit, and is the least
costly to implement. However, it requires a lot of manpower, and benefits only a small
fraction of the people because the number of providers is limited and the process may
take a long time. This program also requires good targeting, as sometimes it can be hard
to identify the beneficiaries. Modifying this program for the youth must be integrated into
the education system to avoid redundancies. Giving youth access to information about
various opportunities in employment may help improve the efficiency of their choices of
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specializations.276 Another interesting type of ALMPs is entrepreneurship assistance.
However, the program tends to only attract a small subset of the population (primarily
male, better educated, in their 30s), and excludes women.277
One difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs is that it is hard to isolate
the impact on the programs since most participants would be looking for jobs even if they
had not participated in the program. Also, no rigorous cost-benefit evaluations have been
done on these programs, and the few existing evaluations do not track long-term
outcomes. Another difficulty is in calculating the deadweight loss, substitution, and
displacement effects of these types of programs.278 It should also be noted that the
creation of ALMPs alone cannot solve all unemployment problems, as they only mainly
target disadvantaged groups, and thus may not have substantial impact on the
unemployment rate.279 Nonetheless, ALMPs remain an important tool for government
during periods of economic growth, but also reduce unemployment among the most
marginal populations.
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Chapter 4c – Importance of Targeting
Universality vs. targeting
In designing any social protection program, most of the debate surrounds which
targeting methods should be used. However, Gelbach and Pritchett (1997) have argued in
favor of universality, stating that “social welfare is maximized in political equilibrium
only when all revenues are spent on universal transfers and none spent on targeted
ones.280” They argue that targeting has the reverse effect than what is typically
anticipated – instead of redistributing from the rich, it redistributes from the poor and
benefits the rich. One example is that “when the tax rate is low, high levels of targeting
will make the combination of informal sector work and large targeted transfers more
attractive to middle income or rich agents than formal sector work without targeted
transfers.281” However, a limitation of Gelbach and Pritchett’s idea is that it rests on a
simplistic model of “political equilibrium” insofar that benefits are targeted to the poor,
others will want to reduce that amount. In reality, there are other reasons that people
would want to favor targeting, namely, to protect the poor in downturns, poor households
may create disruptions if they do not receive targeted benefits during transition, and in
the long run, the aspect will increase overall productivity in which everyone benefits.
Their argument has also been supported by Mkandawire (2005) who argues that
the logic of targeting is flawed in that the countries that need targeting the most are those
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that lack the administrative skills and capabilities to do so.282 Another argument against
targeting put forward by both Mkandawire and Gelbach and Pritchett is that the money
allocated toward targeting would take up the amount of money that could otherwise have
gone to the beneficiaries, so that “more for the poor means less for the poor.”283 Weiss
(2004) argues that since targeting is inherently incompatible with administrative capacity
in developing countries, even in cases where targeting precision is improved, some
targeting and misappropriation error are inevitable.284 Rather, Weiss finds that
macroeconomic growth, rather than targeted interventions, has been the key driver in
reducing poverty. 285 Nonetheless, despite the difficulty and costs associated with targeted
interventions, Weiss (2004) would concede that social protection programs still hold a
pivotal role in protecting the poor in times of crises, citing that health and education
interventions in Indonesia after the 1997 Financial Crisis as a prime example.286
Moreover, the extra targeting and monitoring costs associated with a CCT may
also be justifiable because “unlike a UCT, a CCT can be seen not as plain social
assistance, but rather as part of a social contract whereby society (through the state)
supports those poor households that are ready to make the effort to ‘improve their
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lives.’287” “A recent analysis of the treatment of the Bolsa Família program in the
Brazilian media provides additional support to the idea that conditions make transfer
programs more politically palatable. There is little question that Bolsa Família is a
popular program in Brazil. An Ipsos opinion poll taken in September 2007 found that the
program tops the list of items mentioned in response to a question on what President Luiz
Lula da Silva had done well in office.288” While not discounting the role of
macroeconomic growth in reducing poverty, those types of intervention typically
discriminate against the poor who may not be able to take advantage of all the
opportunities presented.
Inserting conditions may also be necessary as households do not always behave
the way informed, rational agents would. Research has suggested that “people often
suffer from self-control problems and excessive procrastination, in the sense that their
day-to-day behavior is inconsistent with their own long-term attitude toward the
future.289” Voters, and other decision makers, may also perceive households that are
investing in their children’s welfare as more deserving, and therefore may be more
receptive to the idea of CCTs resulting in a higher budget availability.290 Furthermore,
households may also have “misguided beliefs” on the expected return of human capital,
thereby discounting the need to send children to school or for health check ups. The rate
of expected return is even lower among poorly-educated parents, which is reflected in the
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case of Mexico, where expected returns among 15 to 25 year-olds (whose fathers have
lower education levels) are lower than realized returns.291
On the other hand, however, universalism has also been criticized due to its lack
of feasibility in its implementation. In practice, universalistic policies end up being
captured by those in power who wish to grant the benefits only to themselves.292
Furthermore, while advocates for universalism argues that targeting is not redistributive,
its critics would pose the same argument, given that the same amount of income transfer
would be given to households of different income levels.293 In this way, targeting is seen
as “quintessentially redistributive” because the amount of benefits given to each
household would correspond to their income level: higher benefits for lower-income
households, and vice versa.294
Regardless of the arguments for universalistic policies, the balance has now
shifted toward targeting since the 1980s.295 R.E. Goodin (1985) argues in favor of
targeting, pushing for the idea that targeting should be broader so that those that
genuinely need the benefit are not excluded because of targeting errors.296 Expanding
targeting may lead to errors of overinclusiveness, but it may be worth it to ensure that
program administrators do not leave out deserving beneficiaries. For example, if the
targeting method aims to reach the bottom 20 percent of the population, the means test
should cover 30 percent so as to reduce the chances that we are excluding people who

291

Fizbein and Schady, “The economic rationale for conditional cash transfers,” 54.
Mkandawire, Targeting and universalism in poverty reduction, 4.
293
Ibid, 6.
294
Ibid, 6.
295
Ibid, 1.
296
Robert E. Goodin, "Erring on the side of kindness in social welfare policy," Policy Sciences 18, no. 2 (1985): 141156, acessed March 10, 2016, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00136718 , 142.
292

83

need it. Moreover, Goodin also brings up the importance of the relative costs of the
program. In terms of CCT, the question becomes whether is it more expensive to keep
eligible people out or to pay for ineligible people in the program. In reducing poverty,
inclusion error affects eligible poor households by leaving “less” for poor households,
making the program less efficient. Conversely, an exclusion error also reduces
inefficiency as it leaves eligible households without help.297 In this way, Goodin (1985)
concludes his argument that “it would be indubitably worse to deny welfare benefits to
people who need and are entitled to them than it is to grant welfare benefits to people
who are not.298” In a way, despite the errors of over-coverage in targeting, the number of
ineligible people who are receiving the benefits are still fewer compared to the number of
people who do not necessarily “need” the benefits yet are receiving them under a more
inclusive policy. The other conclusion that Goodin draws is that in situations in which
more people are deserving of the welfare benefits, program administrators should have
more lax policies in terms of applicant screening.299 Goodin’s conclusion is echoed by
Cameron and Shah (2012) who argues that errors of undercoverage are judged more
harshly than errors of overcoverage; and finds that “a poorly targeted and administered
program can significantly disturb the social fabric within a community, to the extent that
people disengage from the community, [which] makes it more susceptible to crime.300”
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Thus, given that targeting is often perceived as more politically acceptable, it is
important to calibrate the precision of targeting. In Indonesia, past cases involving other
social protection programs such as, JPS (first massive social safety net) and a fuel
subsidy program, have shown that targeting mechanisms remain poor and suffer from
both inclusion and exclusion error.301 In Indonesia, the need to increase efficiency for
targeting is enhanced by fuel subsidies reductions since 2000.302 Given that precise
targeting requires high administrative capacity that may not exist in developing countries
where most CCTs are enacted, the challenge remains to create combinations of targeting
methodology that fit each community best.
Crafting the appropriate targeting method for each community is also especially
relevant in communities where there is a high potential for conflict, as an error of
overcoverage or undercoverage may serve as a trigger point in exacerbating pre-existing
conflict in the community or creating new conflicts.
Types of targeting
Different regions have tended to opt for different targeting methods. For example,
given its history of central planning, East and Central Asia have inherited a more
extensive administrative system that have a higher capacity to conduct proxy-means
tests.303 Southeast Asia, on the other hand, has tended to use categorical targeting or selftargeting based on work or consumption.304 Moreover, richer countries which arguably
301
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have higher administrative capacity, tend to opt for simple or proxy means tests whereas
less developed countries would generally use more self-targeting and categorical
targeting method. Moreover, across program types, cash transfers typically use some sort
of means testing and categorical testing (e.g. age of child to determine cash benefit).
In designing a targeting methodology, it is important to determine who should be
in charge of determining beneficiaries of the program. On the one hand, a decentralized
targeting method seems efficient because local leaders tend to have better knowledge of
local context than the central government, such as additional household’s income and
assets which they might otherwise try to hide from a central government official.305
However, local leaders might not be best for deciding beneficiaries in areas where
“possibility of local conflict is high” due to pre-existing ethnic and religious tension (or
income inequality).306 Decentralized targeting methods are also prone to local elite
capture, in which the powerful few in the community would capture a bigger share of the
benefits.307 On the other hand, centralized targeting method may be more efficient as they
can have greater access to a centralized information system and can be more impartial to
certain regions, or even households in the community. Thus, the question between
centralized or decentralized targeting method should hinge upon, is to decide which actor
has the best access to knowledge on individual households or circumstances and has the
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best ability to deliver the benefits most cost-efficiently and would make decisions that
avoid exacerbating conflict.308
Beyond deciding who should determine the beneficiaries, program administrators
also have to look at the different types of targeting methods. Some of the most common
approaches used in designing social protection programs include, in order of most
exhaustive and administratively costly to the least, proxy-means tests, simple-means
tests, community-based targeting, categorical targeting, and self-selection.
Simple-means test
Simple means test is an individual assessment comparing “resources such as
income under the command of an individual or household with some threshold or cutoff.309” It is often used as a targeting method for direct transfer programs and fee-waiver
programs.310 This type of targeting method is often found in parts of Latin America, and
East and Central Europe; and the majority of means-tested methods are used in cash
transfer programs.311 Simple-means tests usually focus on income level as its sole
indicator, and requires less administrative work compared to proxy-means tests. Since the
answer is more clear-cut, this type of test leaves smaller room for enumerators’ discretion
and may be a more objective and impartial method. It also reduces administrative costs as
answers may be submitted without a home visit. Given that most developing countries do
not have a high administrative capacity yet, simple-means test seems to work best as an
initial, first-step filter.
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Proxy-means tests
Proxy-means test is a systematic way of generating a score through observable
household characteristics (e.g. location and quality of house, ownership of assets,
education and occupation of the household members).312 Information is gathered similar
to that of means tests, either by household visits by administrators or office visits by
potential beneficiaries. Proxy-means test is considered the more exhaustive than simplemeans test because it requires a home visit and leaves more room for discretion on the
part of the enumerators as the set of questions are more open-ended. However, processing
the information gathered from proxy-means tests requires a high administrative capacity
and a large information processing system.313 Typically, these proxy-means tests are
created by a single agency in the central government. This type of targeting is best used
when countries have a moderately sophisticated computer network, and used in long-term
development programs rather than short-term humanitarian assistance following a
crisis.314 One reason for this is because household surveys take a while to register
information and does not take into account “quickly changing variables.315”
Community-based targeting
Community-based targeting involves a group of community members to decide
who the beneficiaries should be in that particular community. The advantage of
community-based targeting is that locals have the best knowledge of each families’ living
conditions and may be a more accurate measure than a simple means test or any
312
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household visit by a program official. Another advantage is that local communities can
decide for themselves its own criteria to define need as most relevant to each
community.316 It is also typically considered a low-cost method, as community members
who play a part are not paid for their time. However, the downside is both conscious and
unconscious bias of each community member who may favor particular ethnic or
religious groups, and thus widening preexisting conflict within the community. Also,
community-based targeting may also perpetuate pre-existing patronage structures to
benefit their close family networks.317 Moreover, community-based targeting usually
does not stand alone as a sole targeting method, but is often paired with other types of
targeting methods. For example, Mexico’s Progresa program integrates community input
only after creating a poverty map to identify poor households and a proxy means test to
screen out non-poor households in those areas.318 Given the high probability of conflict
that community-based targeting can cause, it is best used in smaller, tight-knit
communities where members know each other and would presumably all come from the
same ethnic or religious background.319
Categorical targeting
Categorical targeting grants individuals eligibility if they fit under a certain
category, such as particular age, gender, ethnicity, land ownership, geographical
location.320 This method is also often referred to as the statistical method. Categorical
targeting leaves little room for personal interpretation, as the categories used are typically
316
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“fairly easy to observe, hard to falsely manipulated, and correlated with poverty.321” In
the case of cash transfer programs, number and age of children would be the most
relevant categories to look at.
Self-targeting
Self-targeting is the least administratively exhaustive and costly as it is up to the
individual to self-report and self-identify as beneficiaries of the program. While the
program is open to all, the criteria of the program make it so that only the poor are
attracted to the program. Such example might include: giving out lower quality
grain/wheat, offering low wages on public work schemes, etc.322 As a result, the non-poor
would choose not to use these benefits.323 One caveat of self-targeting is the stigma
associated with it, but it may vary depending on how the culture views poverty and the
role of the state in providing welfare benefits.324 In Indonesia, for example, the Padat
Karya workfare program, which uses self-targeting method, finds high participations for
women in Bali (mostly Hindhus) and less so in other areas of the country (mostly
Muslims).325 This type of targeting method is generally desirable if the country lacks
sophisticated administrative capacity, or in crisis settings where income is irregular and
cannot be properly quantifiable through proxy means test or simple means test.
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How targeting has worked in other social protection programs in Indonesia
In Indonesia, a study by Suryahadi, Sim and Negara (2015) argued that
centralized targeting is generally superior to decentralized targeting, as shown through
the example of the “Rice for the Poor” program and direct cash transfers.326 The “Rice for
the Poor” is a decentralized program, with local leaders determining the list of
beneficiaries, while the Bantuan Langsung Tunai (direct cash transfer program) is a
centralized program, with the central government determining the list of beneficiaries.
How the targeting works for the “Rice for the Poor” program combines both the efforts of
the central and local government agency. First of all, the central logistic agency, Bulog,
determined quantity of rice by the number of poor households in a particular village to be
purchased by local village authority. From there, local village officials take over and are
the ones distributing the rice directly to the appropriate households.327 However,
decentralized targeting method is also susceptible to local elite capture, which
compromises protection for minorities and results in poorer targeting performance.328
Interestingly, although little evidence shows the effect of local elite capture in Indonesia
on targeting, elite capture happens more often during distribution.329 For example, local
village leaders hold the power to tell program officials where to distribute the rice
benefits in the “rice for the poor” program, and uses this as a base for their own electoral
support.330 Thus, given the prevalence of elite capture, centralized targeting methods
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often work better in the case of Indonesia.331 Furthermore, in high-inequity communities,
there is a decrease in exclusion error, but no effect on inclusion error, due to a clearer
distinction between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Thus, in areas that are more
highly unequal, it is easier for local officials to distinguish beneficiaries.332
Best combination for CCT in Indonesia
First, the central government must work with local governments and the National
Family Planning Coordination Agency (BKKBN) to compile a special household
economic survey, which includes households’ poverty status to determine targeting
region. To screen out the applicants, the central government would have to create a set of
national criteria. Moreover, in the case of CCTs, there also needs to be categorical
targeting that filters through eligible households by only highlighting families with
children and/or pregnant women. Moreover, currently, most targeting methods for social
protection programs in Indonesia would include enumerators who would visit local
district heads to conduct field investigation and interview local community figures to
narrow down the list of beneficiaries. However, studies have often found that at this
stage, enumerators are prone to skipping houses and not conducting a full and fair field
investigation. They are also often overwhelmed with the number of interviews to conduct
and houses to visit.
Thus, to reduce the workload of the enumerators, there has to be an in-between
stage, whereby village heads – not individuals in those villages – are to submit a proposal
to the central government outlining how they would equitably distribute the benefits in
331
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their community. The village heads would also have to make the case as to how their
proposal would fit under the national criteria set out by the central government. By
empowering the village heads to “compete” to get these benefits, this would increase
effectiveness and accountability when implementing the program. It would also help the
monitoring process done later on by the enumerators on a selective basis, who would
only focus on ensuring the village heads are following through with their proposal instead
of doing a general field research and using the same set of categories to judge different
communities. Since previous experiences in Indonesia have shown that a centralized
targeting method works better, the central government will decide which applications get
through, with the help of a committee comprising of representatives from each province
in the country. The central government and the committee would then be able to see if the
proposal set forth is deemed as feasible, cost-effective and equitable to all members of
their community.
In certain cases, the central government may make special provisions to universal
benefits in a particular community when there is a high degree of income equality in the
area (and all the households fit around the same income threshold). On the other hand, in
highly unequal areas, the central government would have to allocate more toward
targeting and monitoring costs, as small errors in targeting could lead to higher
probability of conflict.
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Conclusion
Since its pilot program in 2007, Program Keluarga Harapan has shown
significant positive impacts on increasing access to education and healthcare, as well as a
tool to reduce conflict. Given the magnitude of poverty in Indonesia, PKH is a necessary
intervention to ensure that the poor are provided with the opportunity to improve their
livelihood (micro-level effect) and to increase stability as the program works to reduce
income inequality and conflict (macro-level effect). By looking at cross-country and
cross-program comparisons of CCTs in other countries, as well as other social protection
programs in Indonesia, this thesis finds that CCTs may reduce or exacerbate conflict, and
subsequently, this thesis seeks an understanding of the right set of policies for the
Indonesian context. Conflict often gets in the way of development, and any program that
can reduce conflict will typically have beneficial long-term social, economic and political
impact.
In particular, this thesis delves into the dilemmas found in creating a targeting
method for CCTs, in terms of whether it should be universal or targeted, loosely or
tightly targeted, and whether it should be determined by local or central government.
Often, in creating the list of beneficiaries, local conflict may arise as local district heads
use their own discretion, which can be greatly influenced by their own pre-existing ethnic
or religious bias. This is especially relevant in the case of Indonesia, with its
decentralized democratic structure, as there are 473 district heads who have considerable
power in their respective jurisdictions.
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This thesis finds that a more central-government focused targeting would work
best in Indonesia, as it streamlines the targeting process and leaves less room for power
abuse at the local level. That being said, targeting should be looser when conducting the
national level proxy-means test to include five to ten percent additional recipients in the
target population. For example, if the test intends to target the lowest 20 percent of the
population, the test should be set at 30 percent instead to ensure that it does not exclude
eligible households that may also benefit from the program. This thesis also proposes a
new targeting strategy by replacing the work of enumerators with a system calling for
proposals submitted by the district heads outlining why and how PKH will work in their
respective areas. This is hoped to increase competitiveness among districts, in order to
motivate them to be more accountable and to reduce administrative costs.
Indonesia is a unique case. Given Indonesia’s geographic size, ethnic and
religious diversity, and history of violence, its targeting method should be more
centralized rather than localized. However, in thinking about how CCTs should be
implemented elsewhere, the usual brief in favor of decentralization may hold even if it
does not hold for Indonesia. For example, in countries that are more ethnically
homogenous, targeting need not be so centralized and community-based targeting may be
advisable as part of the targeting process. In an ethnically heterogeneous country like
Indonesia, community-based targeting may lead to more conflict, especially if the
traditional power structure tends to favor one group over another. Furthermore, given
Indonesia’s relative size, it is also more cost-efficient to control targeting and monitoring
costs centrally, though this may not be the case everywhere.
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Perhaps one aspect of the policy that is transferable to other countries is the
creation of a nationwide household survey to identify poor households that can be used to
streamline all other social protection programs in the countries. A national survey, which
is also implemented in the Philippines, will allow similar or complementary programs to
work together.
Moreover, this thesis finds that CCTs are more than just a cash transfer program
and highlights the importance of its conditionality in cash transfers. The role of
facilitators in CCTs, in contrast to in UCTs, is vital in changing perceptions and
promoting behavior changes in terms of how families perceive the importance of
education and health services, which ultimately helps to shift the favor toward human
capital investment. Furthermore, the role of facilitators and counseling support are also
crucial in PKH’s graduation schemes in ensuring households go through a smooth
transition and reintegration back into the economy. Through entrepreneurship support
and household management, CCT beneficiaries gain confidence and a sense of
empowerment, and induce lasting behavioral changes.
This thesis also finds that the role of conditionality is crucial in reducing
incentives to engage in criminal activity. This works through the income effect – when
beneficiaries receive more dispensable income through the program, they are less likely
to engage in financially-motivated crimes – and through the time effect – when children
are enrolled in school, they have less time to engage in criminal and risky behavior.
Finally, though many conditions and measures are required to ensure that CCT
programs are successful in improving people’s livelihood and reducing conflict, the
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Indonesian case demonstrates that CCT programs can be highly worthwhile. People in
fragile and conflict-affected states are “more than twice as likely to be undernourished as
those in other developing countries, more than three times as likely to be unable to send
their children to school, twice as likely to see their children die before age five, and more
than twice as likely to lack clean water.333” CCTs can address these problems, and if
conflict risks development, then any effort to mitigate conflict that simultaneously boosts
development should be explored further.
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